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The Penal Dimensions of Punitive
Damages
By JEFFERY W. GRASS*
Introduction
It is to be presumed that the state has fully protected its own inter-
ests, or as fully at least as they could be protected by laws, when it
provides for the punishment of crime in its criminal statutes ...
[P]unitive damages cannot be allowed on the theory that [they are]
for the benefit of society at large, but must logically be allowed on
the theory that they are for the sole benefit of the plaintiff. . . a
theory which is repugnant to every sense of justice.'
The above declaration by the Washington State Supreme Court
echos the premise of this Article: the state should not be allowed to
circumvent due process by delegating punitive functions to private liti-
gants and civil courts. Punitive damages occupy a unique position in
American jurisprudence, a punishment mechanism properly belonging
to, but nevertheless evading, the criminal justice system.2
Although the concept of private prosecution and punishment
through civil procedures raises viable constitutional issues, very little
analysis is available on the constitutional dimensions of punitive dam-
ages.3 Courts usually avoid the issue, although it is raised repeatedly in
* B.A., 1980, Western Washington University; J.D., 1983, Southwestern University
School of Law. The author wishes to thank the staff of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quar-
terly for their assistance in the publication of this Article.
1. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 53-54, 25 P. 1072, 1074 (1891).
2. See Greeley, S.L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Yeager, 11 Colo. 345, 350, 18 P.211, 214 (1888)
(punitive damages "usurp the powers of the state in the infliction of punishment").
3. A recent exception to this proposition is Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Re-
forming Punitive Damages, 69 VA. L. Rrv. 269 (1983).
Various commentators have addressed the constitutionality of punitive damages. See Du-
bois, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury, Products Liability and Professional Malpractice
Cases Bonanza or Disaster?, 43 INS. COuNS. J. 344, 348-49 (1976); Riley, Punitive Damages:
The Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment, 27 DRAKE L. Rlv. 195, 243-45 (1978); Note, The Imposi-
tion of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. RaV.
1158, 1177-85 (1966); Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant,
34 U. CmI. L. Rnv. 408 (1967).
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defendants' briefs.4 When courts do face the issue, they traditionally up-
hold the punitive damages doctrine with opinions that demonstrate a re-
luctance to reverse precedent,5 application of constitutionally
unsupported analysis,6 or deference to legislative labeling.7 For example,
the California Supreme Court has stated that the unconstitutionality of
punitive damages is a proposition that frequently has been rejected.8
Surprisingly, while the United States Supreme Court has never addressed
the issue,9 California courts rely upon a United States Supreme Court
opinion that never discussed or mentioned punitive damages as authority
for rejecting the proposition. 0
The punitive damages doctrine is an anomaly in tort law. By pun-
ishing defendants rather than compensating plaintiffs," its purpose falls
squarely under the ambit of criminal law. Yet only minimal dissertation
is available discussing whether punitive damages are, in fact, "criminal"
or "penal."1 2 Ostensibly, a determination that punitive damages are pe-
4. As an example, the respondent's brief in Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Cal. 3d 388,
650 P.2d 1171, 185 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1982) raised the issue of vagueness regarding CAL. Civ.
CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1984) (California's punitive damages statute). Brief for Respon-
dent at 21-28. The court dismissed the challenge in a footnote relying on "controlling prece-
dent." Hasson, 32 Cal. 3d at 402 n.2, 650 P.2d at 1179 n.2, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 663 n.2. None of
the opinions cited as precedent by the court contain more than a passing comment on any
vagueness issue.
5. Most blatent is the United States Supreme Court's stance. The Court has stated: "We
are aware that the propriety of this doctrine has been questioned by some writers; but if re-
peated judicial decisions for more than a century are to be received as the best exposition of
what the law is, the question will not admit of argument." Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 363, 371 (1851). The Supreme Court still follows Day. See Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 159 (1967).
While stare decisis still controls, it has been questioned. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403
U.S. 29, 84 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App.
3d 740, 759, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 248 (1980), appeal denied, 450 U.S. 1051 (1981) (Elkington,
J., concurring) ("Were it not for [precedent] holding punitive damages. . . to be constitution-
ally flawless, I would entertain doubt as to their due process survivability."). See also infra
text accompanying notes 87-100.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 75-80.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 81-86.
8. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 819-20, 598 P.2d 452, 457, 157
Cal. Rptr. 482, 487 (1979), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 912 (1980).
9. Wheeler, supra note 3, at 273.
10. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 820, 598 P.2d at 457, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 487 (citing United States v.
Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 46-49 (1914)). Regan involved the question whether "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt" was required in an action by the United States to collect a penalty for
violation of certain federal laws.
11. See generally K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 7.6(A) (1980) (the goal of civil law
is not punishment).
12. Id. ch. 7 (briefly outlining both challenges and defenses to the constitutionality of
punitive damages); Wheeler, supra note 3, at 333-51 (the only serious examination available on
whether punitive damage procedures satisfy due process).
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nal would activate procedural safeguards available to defendants in crim-
inal proceedings. 13 Nevertheless, there has been a general failure to raise
and pursue the penal dimensions of punitive damages.
While this omission at first seems surprising, it is easily explained.
First, constitutional challenges to the punitive damages doctrine are not
available until post-judgment proceedings. 14  Even then, a defendant
faced with a multi-million dollar judgment is not likely to focus his ap-
peal on the constitutional issue since courts rarely consider the issue
when it is presented.' 5 Second, many briefs and arguments that do raise
the issue focus on due process considerations such as statutory vague-
ness. 6 Although such arguments are attractive, they are difficult to pos-
13. See K. REDDEN, supra note 11, at § 7.2(A)(6); Wheeler, supra note 3, at 337 (noting
that the concept of quasi-criminality is "nebulous"). Criminal procedural safeguards apply
only if the sanction is punitive, and in that event, they should all apply. Id. In a literal sense,
however, due process does not require every procedural safeguard in every proceeding. For
example, both the right to counsel and the right to trial may be limited. See, eg., Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (the right to counsel is not unconstitutionally denied where no
actual imprisonment results); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (the right to trial by
jury does not generally apply to those cases punishable by no more than six months). How-
ever, those criminal due process guarantees that would be particularly important to the puni-
tive damages defendant-reasonable doubt, right against self-incrimination, and unanimous
jury verdict-have not been restricted in any federal criminal proceeding.
14. Since punitive damages may not apply to a particular case, or may not be awarded at
all, the constitutional objections cannot be asserted until post-judgment proceedings. In re
Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152, 1157 (N.D. Cal. 1982). This procedure is in ac-
cord with Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936) and its progeny, holding
the general federal preference is to avoid reaching constitutional issues whenever possible. See
Ashwander, 543 F. Supp. at 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
15. In California, the courts rely upon precedent as dispositive of constitutional chal-
lenges to the punitive damages doctrine. The seminal case and leading authority is Toole v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). Toole only briefly
addressed the constitutional issues presented, deferring instead to the rules of civil procedure
governing punitive damages claims. Id. at 716-17, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 417-18. Although the case
turned on the "label" of the proceeding, it is cited as controlling and dispositive of constitu-
tional challenges. See, eg., Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Cal. 3d at 402 n.2, 650 P.2d at 1179-
80 n.2, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 663 n.2; Zhadan v. Downtown L.A. Motors, 66 Cal. App. 3d 481,
502, 136 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144 (1976). Otherjurisdictions have been equally abrupt in disposing
of constitutional challenges to the punitive damages doctrine. See, eg., Campus Sweater &
Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr., 515 F. Supp. 64, 108-09 n.129 (D.S.C. 1979) (multiple
constitutional questions addressed in a single footnote); Resource Exploration & Mining, Inc.
v. Itel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 515, 517 (D. Colo. 1980); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38,
46 (Alaska 1979), cert denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
16. See, eg., Brief for Respondent at 21-28, Hasson, 32 Cal. 3d 388, 650 P.2d 1171, 185
Cal. Rptr. 654 (arguing statutory vagueness of punitive damages statute and against retroac-
tive application of expanded punitive damages liability); Opening Brief for Appellant at 99-
120, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (arguing
statutory vagueness of punitive damages statute and asserting the right to have punitive dam-
ages liability decided by higher standards of proof); Opening Brief for Appellants at 59-67,
American-Hawaiian S.S. Co. v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 38 Cal. App. 3d 73, 112 Cal. Rptr.
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tulate given the current scope of review available in the federal courts.17
Third, most defendants arguing against punitive damages raise the issue
of double jeopardy.1 8 They contend that assessing punitive damages re-
sults in a violation of the Fifth Amendment when the defendant has al-
ready been punished or potentially faces a criminal sanction.19 Such
arguments remain unpersuasive because as long as punitive damages are
not considered penal, the Fifth Amendment does not apply.2"
This Article provides an in-depth inquiry into the nature of punitive
damages and offers a framework on which to base future considerations
of the doctrine. The analysis rests on basic guidelines used for determin-
897 (1974) (arguing statutory vagueness of punitive damages statute, improper delegation of
legislative power in allowing jury to assess punitive damages, and need for protection against
duplicative claims).
17. Any conceivable basis for finding a rational relationship between the statute and any
legitimate government end will save the statute from substantive due process challenge. Thus,
unless the law is wholly arbitrary or irrational, the statute will be upheld. Only if the defend-
ant can show that the law affects some fundamental right or suspect class will the government
be required to show that the law "is necessary to promote a compelling or overriding interest."
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. NELSON, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 448 (2d ed. 1983).
The punitive damages defendant might make an alternative argument on procedural due
process grounds. Since the Fourteenth Amendment protects money as a property interest,
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84-87 (1972), the proceeding for state deprivation of money
must meet some minimal level of due process unless the deprivation is characterized as "de
minimus." Id. at 90 n.21. If only the property interest is at stake, then the relative weight of
the interest to be deprived will determine the form of notice and hearing required by due
process. See id.; see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 n.3 (1971) (collection of
cases addressing this particular issue).
Where the subject matter involves punishment, however, due process dictates higher
levels of protection, especially as to the nature of the hearing and the right to have a full and
fair adjudication of the issues. See generally Wheeler, supra note 3, at 273-322 (analyzing puni-
tive damages under procedural due process tests recently elaborated by the Supreme Court in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). Punitive damages arguably are constitutionally
infirm under a procedural due process analysis, given that liability for punitive damages has no
defined limits of punishment, jury verdicts often exceed a million dollars, and the jury verdict
may be wholly arbitrary, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
18. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that no person shall "be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONsT., amend. V.
19. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd. 548 F. Supp. 357, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 812, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 383 (1981); E. F.
Hutton & Co. v. Anderson, 42 Colo. App. 497, 596 P.2d 413 (1979); cf. In re Northern Dist. of
Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod., 526 F. Supp. 887, 899-900 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (multiple puni-
tive damages punishments do not constitute "double jeopardy," but overlapping awards do
violate fundamental fairness assured by due process). But see Campus Sweater & Sportswear
Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr., 515 F. Supp. at 108-09 n.129; 111 East 88th St. Partners v. Fine,
110 Misc. 2d 960, 964, 443 N.Y.S.2d 195, 198 (1981) (rejecting similar propositions).
20. The general rule is that the prohibition against double jeopardy applies only to crimi-
nal actions. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). The same rule has been held
inapplicable to punitive damages proceedings. See supra note 19. Accord K. REDDEN, supra
note 11, at § 7.2(A)(1) (defendant must convince the court that punitive damages are penal in
nature to institute criminal procedural safeguards).
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ing whether a statute is penal. The United States Supreme Court set
forth the controlling guidelines in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martine21 and
recently reaffirmed them in United States v. Ward.22 Although the Court
in Ward stated that the Kennedy considerations23 were "neither exhaus-
tive nor dispositive, ' ' u4 this Article fleshes out the necessary considera-
tions into an adequate analysis, taking into account current trends in the
federal and state courts .2  The Article concludes that the punitive dam-
ages concept is penal and therefore should trigger application of constitu-
tionally mandated criminal safeguards.
26
I. Kennedy and Ward
Clearly, punitive damages constitute a penalty or punishment .2  No
court, however, has applied the Kennedy/Ward criteria to punitive dam-
age statutes although commentators have noted that such an analysis is
21. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). Kennedy enunciated seven basic factors for determining whether
a statute is penal. See infra text accompanying note 35. The Kennedy factors have been uti-
lized by several federal courts to determine whether a statute was penal or remedial. See, ag.,
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 518 F.2d 990, 1000-11
(5th Cir. 1975), a.t'd, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) (construing the nature of civil penalties assessed
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act); United States v. General Motors Corp., 403
F. Supp. 1151 (D. Conn. 1975) (construing penalties assessed under the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act). The Kennedy inquiries have been utilized in construing state statutes as
well. See, eg., In re Garay, 89 N.J. 104, 113, 444 A.2d 1107, 1111-12 (1982) (construing a
penalty under a state Medicaid statute).
22. 448 U.S. 242 (1980). Ward addressed the alleged criminal nature of a sanction under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments. Ward has been held applicable to
state statutes as well. See People v. Walsh, 89 Ill. App. 3d 831, 833 n.1, 412 N.E.2d 208, 210
n.1 (1980) (whether civil penalty for contempt should be considered criminal).
23. See infra text accompanying note 35.
24. Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
25. Indeed, the Supreme Court already has restricted portions of the doctrine's applica-
tion on public policy and constitutional grounds. For example, punitive damages may not be
assessed against municipalities. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
Nor may they be imposed on defendants in defamation actions absent a showing of knowing
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342, 350
(1974). Additionally, nonpunitive considerations such as attorneys' fees may not serve as a
function of punitive damages. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851). Despite the
Court's hostility to punitive damages, however, it has never addressed the penal dimensions of
the doctrine. Wheeler, supra note 3, at 276.
26. See Wheeler, supra note 3, at 337 and supra note 13.
27. Punitive damages are assessed to punish wrongdoers and to deter further occurrence
of wrongful acts. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 43, 48 (1979); Evans
v. Gibson, 220 Cal. 476, 490, 31 P.2d 389, 395 (1934); Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 80, 135
N.W.2d 789, 798 (1965). Punitive damages are not compensatory, "they are private fines
.... " Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 350.
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appropriate.28
To determine whether to activate criminal safeguards, the Court in
Ward considered whether a penalty under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 197629 was remedial or penal. The Court
enunciated a two-part inquiry. First, the Court must determine whether
the legislature expressly or impliedly intended to construe the statutory
penalty as criminal or civil.30 If the intention is civil, the Court then
determines whether "the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in pur-
pose or effect as to negate that intention."31 The latter inquiry is satisfied
when the sanction has a punitive end that cannot be justified as having
any legitimate remedial purpose.32
It is indisputable that legislatures consider punitive damages statutes
civil punishments. Punitive damages statutes are not found in criminal
or penal codes, and punitive damages are universally awarded in civil
proceedings.33 The most important part of the two-prong Ward analysis
is therefore the second prong-"purpose and effect" of the punitive dam-
ages sanction.
This second inquiry is undertaken by an analysis of seven factors
elaborated in Kennedy.3a The Kennedy factors were derived from the
Court's historic examinations of "penal" statutes. The factors that histor-
ically have required institution of criminal procedural safeguards are:
28. See K. REDDEN, supra note 11, at § 7.2(A)(1); Wheeler, supra note 3, at 333-37.
Ward and Kennedy are proper touchstones of inquiry since they analyze whether the purpose
of the sanction is to punish the defendant. See infra text accompanying notes 30-37.
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (b) (5) (1976). That provision contains a requirement that any dis-
charge of oil or hazardous substances from an onshore or offshore facility into navigable wa-
ters must be reported to the United States by the person in charge of the vessel or the facility.
At issue in Ward was whether the reporting requirements violated the respondent's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. Following respondent's report of an oil spill
from his facility, he was assessed a civil penalty of $500 under 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (b) (6) (1976).
The penalty was based upon the statutorily required report. The respondent asserted that the
reporting requirement violated his right to be free from self-incrimination since the penalty
was effectively criminal. The respondent lost his case in district court and the Tenth Circuit
reversed on appeal, holding that the statute was effectively penal when scrutinized under the
Kennedy tests. Ward, 448 U.S. at 247-48. The Supreme Court reversed, finding no "quasi-
criminal" penal effect that would trigger the Fifth Amendment's protection against compul-
sory self-incrimination. 448 U.S. at 251-55.
30. 448 U.S. at 248.
31. Id. at 248-49.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 443-511. Under the Kennedy "alternative purpose
test," if a legitimate remedial purpose can be found in the penalty, the statute will not be
construed as penal.
33. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
240b (West Supp. 1984).
34. 372 U.S. at 168-69. While these considerations were applied to questions of federal
law in both Kennedy and Ward, they apply with equal force to state statutes. See, eg., In re
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Whether, the sanction involves an affirmative disability or re-
straint, whether it has historically been regarded as punishment,
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retri-
bution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned . ...
Applying each of the traditional factors to the punitive damages
doctrine reveals no startling elucidation. When the punitive damages
concept is analyzed and juxtaposed with the cases cited in Kennedy, the
conclusion is inescapable that they are penal in nature, spirit, and juris-
prudence, and thus mandate higher standards of procedural protec-
tion.36 Although any single factor can be conclusive,3 7 all of them are
Garay, 89 N.J. 104,444 A.2d 1107 (1982) (construing a state statute authorizing civil penalties
for Medicaid fraud).
The Kennedy Court considered whether expatriation statutes could be utilized to divest
United States citizens of their citizenship, without affording constitutional protections nor-
mally associated with criminal proceedings. In the first of two cases addressed by the Court,
respondent Mendoza-Martinez had fled the United States during the Second World War to
avoid military service. Following the war, he had returned to the United States, where he was
convicted and served a prison term for draft evasion. Thereafter, he lived in the United States
until 1953, when he was arrested and ordered deported by the Attorney General under a
federal law that stripped the citizenship from anyone who voluntarily'remained outside the
United States during wartime for purposes of evading military obligations.
In the second case, respondent physician Cort was inducted into the military while living
in England. He remained abroad, twice refusing to report for duty in 1953, and was indicted
for failure to appear for physical examination. He alleged that the induction was an attempt to
bring him to the United States to persecute him for his Communist affiliations. In 1959, Cort
applied for a renewal of his passport in Prague. His request was denied by the State Depart-
ment because his United States citizenship had been forfeited under federal law. Kennedy, 372
U.S. at 147-52.
The Court found that the expatriation statutes were punitive in nature. A review of the
legislative and judicial history revealed that their only purpose was to punish the wrongdoer.
Thus, the statutes were criminal in substance and unconstitutional because they permitted
punishment without the procedural protections delineated in the Bill of Rights. Id. at 170-85.
35. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
36. See generally Wheeler, supra note 3 (concluding that statutory maximums, bifurcated
trials, higher evidentiary standards, all criminal protections of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments, and most criminal protections of the Sixth Amendment are mandated in punitive dam-
ages proceedings). See also K. REDDEN, supra note 11, at § 7.2(A)(2)(a) (in analyzing the
punitive damages doctrine, Kennedy should be used to determine if the Bill of Rights applies to
assessing a penalty in such proceedings).
37. For example, the Court in Ward analyzed the effect of the penalty in question solely
under the fifth Kennedy criterion of "whether 'the behavior to which [the penalty] applies is
already a crime."' Ward, 448 U.S. at 249-50 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69). Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that this test was the only Kennedy criterion appli-
cable to the facts of the case. The Court went on to state that the Kennedy inquiries were
"neither exhaustive nor conclusive," id. at 250, indicating that the criminal nature of a penalty
may be proven by other factors beyond the scope and consideration of Kennedy.
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considered below because of their importance to this examination of the
punitive damages doctrine. In addition, since no commentator previ-
ously has elaborated on the authorities relied upon by the Kennedy
Court, each is considered in order to delineate the acceptable outer
boundaries separating civil from criminal law.
II. The Kennedy Factors
A. Affirmative Disability or Restraint
The first historical test noted by Kennedy is "[w]hether the sanction
involves an affirmative disability or restraint. . . ." The Court cited
three opinions that formulated and utilized this criterion.39 The underly-
ing proposition from the cases is that where a civil statute imposes a
disability or restraint on an ascertainable group of persons for prior con-
duct, it constitutes a punishment that courts will not sanction without
appropriate procedural safeguards.
In Ex parte Garland," a post Civil War oath requiring attorneys to
swear that they had not committed certain acts against the Union was
held invalid because a presidential pardon had exonerated the proscribed
acts.41 The Court held that the required oath attempted to punish indi-
rectly activities that constitutionally were no longer punishable.42 Crimi-
nal procedural safeguards were thus mandated.
In United States v. Lovett,43 the second opinion cited by Kennedy,
the Court held a federal statute invalid for denying compensation to cer-
tain government employees who allegedly had engaged in subversive con-
duct.' The law was designed to forever bar the employees from
government service. This effect, the Court said, constituted punishment
without trial.45 Like Garland, the Court held that punishment could not
be effectuated in a vacuum of due process.' Deprivation of liberty or
property as a means of indirect punishment for selected activities could
not be inflicted without high standards of procedural protection.47 The
38. 372 U.S. at 168.
39. Id. at n.22. (citing Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303 (1946); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866)).
40. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
41. Id. at 375.
42. Id. at 380-81.
43. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
44. Id. at 308-13.
45. Id. at 316.
46. Id. at 315. The rights at issue inLovett were the rights against bills of attainder (U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3) and ex post facto laws. Id.
47. By providing for duly constituted courts, the Framers of the Constitution intended to
safeguard the people of this country from punishment without trial. These constitutional pro-
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basic premise of both decisions is that government cannot punish con-
duct through an unconstitutional procedure.
The third case cited in Kennedy, Flemming v. Nestor,48 clarifies this
point. Pursuant to federal law, the plaintiff-immigrant lost his Social Se-
curity benefits after being deported for having been a communist party
member twenty years earlier.49 The loss of benefits, however, was not
triggered by communist affiliation, but by the fact of deportation.50 The
loss was not premised on any proscribed conduct. The Court observed
that since suspension of Social Security benefits to deportees rationally
could relate to a legitimate government interest, such as keeping the dol-
lar in the United States economy, the statute in question was constitu-
tional." Echoing Garland and Lovett, the Court reasoned that to
constitute an affirmative disability, the sanction or loss must be activated
by the actor's conduct, and not merely directed to the result of past be-
havior. If the sanction or loss is nothing other than punishment, it is
unconstitutional absent criminal procedural safeguards.52
Punitive damages are not awarded as compensation or for any reme-
dial purpose. 3 They do not redress injury; rather, they punish anti-so-
cial behavior. 4 Similarly, the statutes in both Garland and Lovett were
designed not to compensate loss, but to punish action. Applying the gen-
eral proposition that a penalty aimed at conduct rather than effect trig-
gers criminal safeguards, punitive damages would appear to activate
those constitutional protections available only to the criminal defendant.
Indeed, punitive damages-with the exception of incarceration-are
tections are mandated where punishment is inflicted. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 317. Contra Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (right to jury trial not absolute); see supra note 13.
48. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
49. Id. at 605-06.
50. Id. at 620.
51. Id. The "national purchasing power resulting from taxation of productive elements of
the economy to provide payments to the retired and disabled" is increased by keeping transfer
payments inside the country. Id. at 612.
52. Id. at 617. The Court also noted that there was no affirmative disability or restraint
"and certainly nothing approaching the 'infamous punishment' of imprisonment." Id.
53. The only purpose, with several exceptions, of punitive damages, is to punish and de-
ter. Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damager Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J.
639, 643 (1980); Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages A CriticalAnalysis of King v. Combs, 49
MARQ. L. REv. 369, 371 (1965). Punitive damages "are not compensation for injury. Instead,
they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its
future occurrence." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). Several jurisdic-
tions allow punitive damages for nonpunitive ends, in which case they are not really punitive
damages at all. See infra text accompanying notes 458-61.
54. See, eg., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 350 (punitive damages are not
compensation for injury); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 82 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (punitive damages are to punish and deter).
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designed to accomplish the same goals as the criminal justice system."
They are exacted in retribution for conduct legislatively determined as
socially unacceptable.5 6 One federal court made a similar observation,
noting that "[p]unitive damages are exacted for the benefit of society
with the intended effect of deterring defendant[s] from similar conduct in
the future. . .. "'I
Instead of examining the substance of the punitive damages penalty,
however, courts generally focus on the severity of the penalty,58 form and
nature of the proceeding,59 the sanctions label,6° or stare decisis61 to jus-
tify result-oriented conclusions that punitive damages lack characteristics
that would mandate criminal procedural safeguards. Ironically, several
courts have gone so far as to state that punitive damages are in fact pe-
nal, but do not merit special procedural safeguards beyond the limits of
civil law.62 One commentator has made comparable observations, but
concluded punitive damages do warrant some additional protections
such as "an increased burden of persuasion." 63 He attributes this need to
their punishment purpose and "frequently large magnitude."' 4 However,
55. See Note, supra note 3, at 1161-62. Punitive damages exact retribution, expressing
societal disapproval of the forbidden act. They specifically serve to deter the defendant from
repeating his transgression and generally serve to discourage others similarly situated from
engaging in the proscribed conduct. Id. See also Hazelwood v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 114
Ill. App. 3d 703, 713, 450 N.E.2d 1199, 1207 0983) (punitive damages are in the nature of a
criminal sanction).
56. In re Paris Air Crash, 427 F. Supp. 701, 706 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (punitive damages are
awarded on the basis of proscribed conduct), rev'd, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1980).
57. In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod., 526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D.
Cal. 1981).
58. E.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702, 728 (5th Cir. 1965) (Rives, J.,
dissenting), af'd, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (punitive damages in excess of $400,000 violate due
process where safeguards of criminal proceedings are not provided); Campus Sweater &
Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr., 515 F. Supp. 64, 108 n.129 (C.D.S.C. 1979); Aretz v.
United States, 456 F. Supp. 397, 408 (S.D. Ga. 1978), afftd, 604 F.2d 417 (1979); Unified
School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 356, 629 P.2d 196, 206 (1981).
59. E.g., Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 716-17, 60 Cal. Rptr.
398, 417-18 (1967) (deferring to legislative placement of punitive damages claims in civil
proceedings).
60. Id.
61. E.g., Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851). One lower federal court
even held that the due process constitutionality of punitive damages was strongly evidenced by
the mere fact that no opinions existed to the contrary. Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp.
1348, 1350 (D. Hawaii 1975).
62. See, e.g., Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.D. Kahn Constr., 515 F. Supp. at
108 n.129 (criminal-type procedural protections not mandated since punitive damages are not
as acrimonious as criminal condemnations); Unified School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 6
Kan. App. 2d at 356, 629 P.2d at 206 (since punitive damages are not as severe as criminal
sanctions, safeguards of criminal prosecutions are not warranted).
63. Comment, supra note 3, at 411.
64. Id. at 434.
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he offers little else in the way of procedural protection, asserting that an
award of punitive damages does not carry the stigma of a criminal sanc-
tion or the "social disapprobation" of conviction.65
In scrutinizing why courts have failed to treat punitive damages as
criminal, the dictates of the cases relied upon in Kennedy form the touch-
stone of analysis. Those cases recognized that the substance of the stat-
ute determines its nature.66 Courts, however, consistently err on this
axiomatic point. Their most common misconception is to look at the
effect of the judgment on the defendant rather than the foundation of the
award. One federal court exemplified this policy when it observed that
"[s]ince a criminal conviction with a possible prison sentence, carries col-
lateral effects which do not necessarily relate directly to the size of the
possible fine, the Court does not consider the jury limited, in a civil ac-
tion, to an award of punitive damages of comparable size."
67
Like courts that focus on collateral effect,68 other jurists, 69 and at
least one commentator,70 also treat punitive damages judgments as an
unequal counterpart to the stigma-type deterrence associated with a
criminal conviction. Such analysis, however, is inconsistent with the
65. "There is no blank on a job application for listing past punitive damages judgments."
Id at 411.
66. Looking at substance over form in construing a statute as penal or remedial is a
Supreme Court rule. See Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1897).
67. Morrissey v. National Maritime Union, 397 F. Supp. 659, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), modi-
fied, 544 F.2d 19 (1976).
68. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
69. In Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 642 P.2d 1305, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784
(1982), the California Supreme Court stated:
The potential punitive damages award in this case is unquestionably a penalty civil in
nature. There is no possibility of the stigma of a criminal conviction nor the poten-
tial loss of personal freedom. Thus, although the award of punitive damages is a type
of penalty imposed to deter wrongful conduct, "[t]he authorization to award exem-
plary damages.. . does not convert a civil action into a criminal action insofar as it
affects constitutional protections in criminal proceedings.
Id. at 161, 642 P.2d at 1313, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 792 (quoting People v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.
3d 421, 433, 525 P.2d 716, 724, 115 Cal. Rptr. 812, 820 (1974)).
70. Comment, supra note 3, at 411. The author's analysis is not persuasive in today's
world of gargantuan awards. That his article is a product of an era yet to see the harsh and
extended use of civil punishment is evidenced by his statement that "punitive damages actions
are rarely given the publicity accorded a criminal conviction." Id. at 411 n.11. On the con-
trary, publicity has led to juries awarding punitive damages even when not in issue. See, e.g.,
Marler v. Allen & Farmer's Ins. Group, 93 N.M. 452, 601 P.2d 85 (1979) (punitive damages
awarded by jury though not requested by plaintiff). Additionally, unlike the present punitive
damages proceedings, courts originally required that the jurors be neighbors or acquaintances
of the defendant, familiar with his financial background, and witnesses to the material events
constituting the alleged wrongful conduct. See Dubois, supra note 3, at 347. Thus, originally,
the need for special procedural protections was not as necessary as today where juries unfamil-
iar with any aspects of the case decide the defendant's fate.
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cases cited in Kennedy. Neither Garland, Lovett, nor Flemming7 dealt
with criminal convictions. If those cases had utilized the conviction-
stigma analysis, the refusal to permit an attorney to practice law or the
denial of government employment certainly would not be equivalent to
the social opprobrium of imprisonment or criminal fines. As the Oregon
Supreme Court has recognized in criticism of the test, "[tihe stigma...
of condemnation can accompany the imposition of a sanction whether it
is imprisonment, or fine, or something else . . "72 Nevertheless, the
decisions in the Kennedy cases turned on the substance of the proceed-
ing-punishment inflicted by indirect means. Thus, the nomenclature of
the penalty is not dispositive.73 Form does not prevail over substance.74
Courts mistakenly have assumed that the magnitude of a punitive
damages award does not trigger criminal safeguards since it does not sub-
ject a defendant to the ultimate sanction of imprisonment.7" But viewing
the relative severities in the abstract is dangerous. As one scholar ob-
served, a one thousand dollar penalty may be as severe to a poor defend-
ant as a six month prison sentence would be to anyone.76 Similarly,
punitive damages may be a far more severe punishment than a criminal
fine carrying the stigma effect of social condemnation.77 But regardless
of the relative harshness of the sanction, the Supreme Court has ada-
mantly stated that "the severity of a sanction is not determinative of its
character as 'punishment.' "78 The Court has never utilized a severity
analysis,79 because while a sanction applied in a regulatory manner may
be extremely severe for some individuals, uniform application in the ad-
ministration of a legitimate government interest, such as qualification for
medical practice, will not be construed as punishment regardless of the
71. See supra notes 39-57 and accompanying text.
72. Brown v. Multnomah Dist. Court, 280 Or. 95, 106, 570 P.2d 52, 59 (1977) (emphasis
added).
73. E.g., Aretz v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 397, 408 (S.D. Ga. 1978), affid, 604 F.2d
417 (l1th Cir. 1979).
74. E.g., Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898). The New Jersey Supreme
Court is in accord, stating that "we will not allow form to prevail over substance. Where the
statutory scheme is so 'punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate' the civil label, it is
deemed criminal for purposes of the constitutional protections at issue." In re Garay, 89 NJ.
104, 111-12, 444 A.2d 1107, 1111 (1982) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249
(1980)).
75. See supra note 69.
76. Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional
Analysis, 60 MINN. L. Rtv. 379, 406 (1976).
77. Punitive damages equal a "badge of disgrace." Wheeler, supra note 3, at 282.
78. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616 n.9 (1960).
79. See Clark, supra note 76, at 404.
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statute's effect on particular individuals.8 0 The manner in which compli-
ance with a statute is effectuated controls, not the end result.
Equally misguided are those cases deferring to the civil process used
to administer punitive awards. For example, in the landmark California
case of Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,8" the defendant specifically
challenged the constitutionality of punitive damages on double jeopardy
grounds and asserted it had the right to the same number of peremptory
challenges as in a criminal trial.8 2 The court, misinterpreting the United
States Supreme Court opinion in United States v. Regan, 3 held that pu-
nitive damages, being a relief sought in a "purely" civil action, failed to
qualify the defendant for any special constitutional protection.8 4 The
court could find no constitutional infirmity in awarding "penal damages"
under rules of civil procedure.8 5 The analysis made no attempt to con-
sider either the purpose of punitive damages or the effect on the defend-
ant, whose plight the court ignored in its preoccupation with an
irrelevant path of inquiry. 6
Perhaps most astonishing, courts often retreat from constitutional
challenges to punitive damages awards by relying upon stare decisis.
One hundred years following the seminal opinions upholding an award
of exemplary damages in England, 7 the Supreme Court declared that a
century of judicial decision upholding the propriety of punitive damages
must be received "as the best exposition of what the law is, [and] the
80. If the government makes no "persuasive showing" that it intended to reach a particu-
lar person or persons for their conduct, the sanction is not punishment. Flemming, 363 U.S. at
616.
81. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
82. Id. at 716 & n.4, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 417 & n.4.
83. 232 U.S. 37 (1914).
84. Actually, the Court in Regan held that the government could assess penalties in civil
proceedings. The power is not disputed. See infra part 111. However, in Regan the substance
of the penalty was not under attack. Although it concededly was assessed for a breach of a
public duty, its remedial or criminal nature was not at issue. Regan, 232 U.S. at 41. The court
in Toole apparently applied Regan at face value, assuming that nothing prevented assessing a
punitive fine in a civil proceeding. See Toole, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 717, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
85. Toole, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 717, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
86. "No amount of [legislative] labelling should determine [a substantive] question."
Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 478, 494 (1974). Also, courts often defer to legislative history in determin-
ing whether a sanction is civil or criminal. See, eg., United States v. Futura, Inc., 339 F. Supp.
162, 165-66 (N.D. Fla. 1972) (quoting S. REP. No. 507, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, reprinted in
1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 2283, 2290-91). Charney points out that while this
defense may be a commendable attempt to carry out congressional purpose, "it avoids the
substantive question of whether Congress has exceeded its constitutional authority." Charney,
supra, at 494.
87. Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763).
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question will not admit of argument."88  Ironically, the Washington
State Supreme Court noted forty years later that the concept of punitive
damages as utilized in America was comparatively modem, resulting
from a misconception of impassioned language and inaccurate expres-
sions by judges in earlier opinions.8 9 The court noted that no early com-
mentators had sanctioned punitive damages9" and, to achieve the least
embarrassing complication of the law, refused to sanction the doctrine.91
Similarly, in 1884, the Colorado Supreme Court stated that in the course
of time, courts would not condone the use of a private action to redress a
public wrong.92
The punitive damages doctrine currently is well-shielded from at-
tack in the courts. As expressed by the California Supreme Court, it is
too late in the day to change precedent. 9 This adherence has even re-
strained one California justice from entertaining "doubt" about the "due
process survivability" of punitive damages.94 While the purpose of ad-
hering to prior decisions is to achieve a "stability" in judicially pro-
pounded principles, 95 the doctrine of stare decisis is not an insuperable
barrier to reconsiderations of prior decisions or principles. 96 Although
Justice Brennan's observation that "it is easier to fit oneself within the
safe haven of stare decisis than to boldly overrule precedents" 97 is well-
taken, the Supreme Court has never considered the doctrine of stare deci-
sis persuasive on constitutional issues.98 Given the recent support of
commentators and jurists questioning the constitutional dimensions of
88. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
89. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 55, 25 P. 1072, 1075 (1891). Even
more interesting is the following observation by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in 1873:
[I]t is interesting as well as instructive to observe that one hundred and twenty years
ago the term smart money was employed in a manner entirely different from the
modem signification which it has obtained, being then used as indicating compensa-
tion for the smarts of the injured person, and not, as now, money required by way of
punishment, and to make the wrong-doer smart.
Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 355 (1873).
90. Spokane Truck, 2 Wash. at 55, 25 P. at 1075.
91. Id. at 51, 25 P. at 1073.
92. Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 551, 5 P. 119, 125 (1884).
93. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809-20, 598 P.2d 452, 457, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482, 487 (1979); see also Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 323, 294 N.W.2d
437, 468 (1980) (Coffy, J., dissenting) ("the question of whether to abolish punitive damages is
not for this court to decide, as it has been a part of our law for so long").
94. Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 759, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 248
(1980) (Elkington, J., concurring).
95. In re Stranger Creek, 77 Wash. 2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508, 511 (1970).
96. Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 201, 241 N.E.2d 12, 13 (1968).
97. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 319-20 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416
(1984).
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punitive damages,99 the demands of justice require that the punitive dam-
ages doctrine no longer be considered a stagnant body of law, especially
where the defendant's rights are at issue. 00
While all the cases cited in Kennedy involved state proceedings, pri-
vate actions administered by the courts are equally considered state ac-
tion.10 1 Given the punitive nature of punitive damages, their customary
use should not be allowed to derail the constitutional protections man-
dated in proceedings devised to punish the defendant for state-con-
demned behavior. As one federal court commented, monetary penalties
do in fact "inflict a pocket-book deterrence or restraint on the recipi-
ent." 102 Arguments that punitive damages automatically dictate a civil
label are unpersuasive under the test of affirmative restraint or disability.
B. Historically Regarded as Punishment?
The second test enunciated in Kennedy is whether the sanction "has
historically been regarded as a punishment ... ,""' Again, not all the
cases cited involved criminal proceedings. In Cummings v. Missouri,'°4
another post Civil War oath was held unconstitutional.105 The oath re-
quired that the declarant swear he had not engaged in certain proscribed
acts against the Union during the Civil War. 106 The oath effectively pre-
cluded the plaintiff-minister from pursuing a religious teaching and
preaching profession."17 The Court held that unconstitutional processes
could not suspend constitutional rights, here the pursuit of happiness.10 8
The oath was a constitutionally invalid sanction since it indirectly pun-
ished behavior rather than legitimately regulated the competency of the
profession. Similar to Garland, Lovett, and Flemming, the inquiry em-
phasized the nature of the statute's effect.
99. See K. REDDEN, supra note 11, at 634; Wheeler, supra note 3, at 269; Note, Punitive
Damages. An Exception to the Right of Privacy?, 5 PEPPERDNE L. REv. 145 (1977).
100. Courts often explicitly acknowledge concern for the plaintiff's rights without realizing
the defendant's rights are at issue since he is the one being punished. The plaintiff has no right
to punitive damages. See infra note 508 and accompanying text.
101. Use of compulsory processes of the court is considered state action since the court is a
governmental entity. Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 856 n.3, 574 P.2d 766, 773 n.3,
143 Cal. Rptr. 695, 702 n.3 (1978).
102. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 518 F.2d 990,
1001 (5th Cir. 1975), aftd, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
103. 372 U.S. at 168.
104. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). Cummings was decided the same day as Exparte Gar-
land, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
105. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 331-32.
106. Id. at 316-17.
107. Id. at 317.
108. Id. at 332.
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Three other cases cited in Kennedy follow different logic.'°9 In Ex
parte Wilson,"' the Court held that imprisonment for forgery tradition-
ally had been regarded as "infamous punishment," activating the consti-
tutional rights to indictment by a grand jury."' Mackin v. United
States" 2 had a similar result, holding that anyone facing potential "infa-
mous punishment" also had the right, under the Fifth Amendment, to
grand jury indictment.' 3  Finally, in Wong Wing v. United States,"' the
Court held that administrative agencies could not imprison aliens at hard
labor without criminal procedural safeguards." 5
While the latter three cases embraced the idea of "infamous punish-
ment," on its face the logic may apply when reexamining the historical
purpose of punitive damages." 6 As the Mackin Court pointed out, the
Fifth Amendment embodies protections for those individuals subject to
infamous punishment as defined originally by English people." 7 And
"[w]hat punishment shall be considered as infamous may be affected by
changes of public opinion in one age to another . . ."1 Punitive dam-
ages, of course, were never considered infamous punishment. They were
developed originally as a nonpenal, civil sanction invoked by the English
judiciary. 19
109. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S.
348 (1886); Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
110. 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
111. Id. at 429. "Deciding nothing beyond what is required by the facts of the case before
us, our judgment is that a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of years at hard labor
is an infamous crime, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution ....
Id. See also infra note 116.
112. 117 U.S. 348 (1886).
113. Id. at 354-55.
114. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
115. Id. at 237.
116. While Wong Wing determined that imprisonment at hard labor constituted "infamous
punishment" for Fifth Amendment purposes, any punishment that can be classied as "infa-
mous" should be sufficient to trigger not only the Fifth Amendment, but any constitutional
safeguard in question. See Clark, supra note 76, at 401.
The Court has not, however, applied Wong Wing, Mackin, or Wilson to a civil proceed-
ing. Yet none of the cases has been overruled, and the very fact that Kennedy cited the cases
indicates that the Wong Wing rationale and principle remain valid. Id. At least one federal
court has indicated recently that "the notion of what constitutes an infamous punishment
varies from one age to another." United States v. Armored Transp., Inc., 620 F.2d 1313, 1319
(9th Cir. 1980).
117. Mackin, 117 U.S. at 351.
118. Id.
119. Walther & Plein, supra note 53, at 370-71. The first reported opinion considering
punitive or exemplary damages is Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768
(1763). The court upheld punitive damages, stating that in the tort action for unlawful search,
the personal injury done to [plaintiff] was very small, so that if the jury had been
confined by their oath to consider the mere personal injury only, perhaps 20 [pounds]
FVol. 12:241
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The English jurors who originally assessed punitive damages had to
be neighbors or acquaintances of the defendant, familiar with his finan-
cial conditions, and witnesses to the tortious act.120 Punitive damages
were not awarded as punishment, nor were the proceedings considered
lacking in protections.121 However, just as the full panoply of constitu-
tional safeguards now protects any criminally accused122 regardless of
the nature of the sanction, punitive damages defendants also deserve
higher procedural protections like the original English safeguards,1 23
which never were adopted as part of the American system. Thus, puni-
tive damages, a severe sanction at loose in America's civil courts, con-
ceivably might be labeled as "infamous" because of their random
infliction of punishment in degrees impossible to calculate.124 But the
bold visage of the "infamous punishment" analysis seldom has been uti-
lized, and usually only in cases where the allegedly criminal penalty in-
volved some type of physical coercion or punishment.125
In any event, the Kennedy test requires only that the sanction histor-
ically had been regarded as punishment, not as infamous punishment.
damages would have been thought damages sufficient; but the small injury done to
the plaintiff... did not appear to the jury in that striking light in which the great
point of law touching the liberty of the subject appeared to them at the trial. . . . I
think they have done right in giving exemplary damages. To enter a man's house by
virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish
Inquisition; a law under which no Englishman would wish to live an hour; it was a
most daring public attack made upon the liberty of the subject.
Id. at 206-07, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768-69.
120. See Dubois, supra note 3, at 347.
121. This fact is exemplified by the original rule that judges and appeals courts would not
disturb the awards since the jurors had first hand knowledge of the facts. Id. at 347. It also
has been contended that judicial deference to jury verdicts was the result of a lack of "estab-
lished standards for measuring compensatory damages." Mallor & Roberts, supra note 53, at
643.
122. See supra note 13.
123. The trier of fact is still considered to be in the best position to assess punitive damages.
As expressed in Neal v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389
(1978), the courts will follow the " 'historically honored standard of reversing as excessive only
those judgments which the entire record, when viewed most favorably to the judgment, indi-
cates were rendered as the result of passion and prejudice.' " Id. at 927, 582 P.2d at 990, 148
Cal. Rptr. at 399 (quoting Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 65 n.12, 529 P.2d
608, 624 n.12, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184, 200 n.12 (1974)). Correspondingly, "[t]rial and appellate
courts have demonstrated their realization that a tighter rein should be employed in punitive
damage cases, as compared to other civil cases, by the frequency in which courts have cut
down the amounts of punitive damage awards or granted new trials if remittitur is not ac-
cepted. .. ." Woolstrum v. Mailloux, 141 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 11, 190 Cal. Rptr. 729, 735-
36 (1983).
124. The difficulty in calculation is due to the unguided and unfettered discretion of sup-
posedly neutral juries, a method unknown in the original English system. See supra text ac-
companying note 120.
125. See generally Clark, supra note 76, at 402-03.
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Labeling punishment as "infamous" is relevant only in assessing whether
all criminal due process safeguards should be provided in a particular
proceeding.1 26 It is not necessary to take the punitive damages analysis
that far. Nevertheless, the reasoning of the "infamous punishment"
cases reconciles those opinions with Cummings, which also examined the
history of the sanction to determine whether it should be considered pun-
ishment and, if so, what safeguards were mandated.
Punitive damages are assessed to accomplish the same punitive ends
as criminal fines and most of the aims of imprisonment. 127 Courts 28 and
commentators1 29 articulate this crossover point in stressing their penal
nature. Nonetheless, it can be argued that punitive damages are no more
penal than treble damages or civil penalties that consistently have been
held remedial. Yet when the punitive damages doctrine is examined
against the very reason that all other types of enhanced damages consist-
ently and overwhelmingly have been held nonpenal, the distinctions be-
tween the penalties support the finding that punitive damages constitute
126. Id. at 401; Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 234.
127. Both criminal law and punitive damages serve the purposes of retribution, deterrence,
and rehabilitation. Comment, supra note 3, at 410. While the penal law does encompass the
additional sanction of incarceration, this distinction is not compelling. The punitive damages
defendant is like the criminal defendant subject only to fine; incarceration normally is not
needed in the punitive damages defendant's case since he is not the type of person that needs to
be incapacitated until he can safely return to society. See generally Collings, Jr., Negligent
Murder-Some Stateside Footnotes to Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith, 49 CALIF. L.
REv. 254, 295 (1961) (incapacitation is required only for that special class of criminals who are
unsafe at large in the community). While incarceration certainly dictates a finding of penal
purposes, its nonexistence is not dispositive of the issue. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958). The issue of whether actual imprisonment results is important only as to whether the
defendant will be entitled to each and every procedural protection that is available when penal
sanctions are levied. See supra note 13.
128. The rule of compensation insufficient to give the injured party all that he is enti-
tled to, and to go beyond that, and usurp the powers of the state in the infliction of
punishment, may well be challenged as a "sin against sound judicial principle"; a sin
which cannot be made to stand for the right by an adherence to it.
Greeley, S.L. & P. Ry. v. Yeager, 11 Colo. 345, 350, 18 P. 211, 214 (1888). A number of
modern courts have held that while they disagree that punitive damages proceedings deserve
special procedural protections, the doctrine is nonetheless penal in nature. See, e.g., Campus
Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr., 515 F. Supp. 64, 108 n.129 (D.S.C. 1979);
Hammond v. North Am. Asbestos Corp., 97 Ill. 2d 195, 211, 454 N.E.2d 210, 219 (1983);
Unified School Dist. No. 409 v. Celotex Corp., 6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 356, 629 P.2d 196, 206
(1981).
129. Comment, supra note 3, at 410-12. The author notes that while punitive damages
serve the same functions as criminal law, not all procedural protections are mandated since a
sanction under criminal law carries greater effect than punitive damages. For example, he
points out that "[t]here is no blank on a job application for listing past punitive damages
judgments." Id. at 411. Contra K. REDDEN, supra note 11, at 604 (the argument can be made
that some punitive damages punishment is "virtually indistinguishable from a criminal fine
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a criminal sanction.
130
To clarify this distinction, a review of the historical treatment of
enhanced and punitive damages is necessary. The contrast in treatment
supports the conclusion that punitive damages in their traditional and
historical role are in theory and practice equivalent to a penal sanction.
At the outset, it must be noted that punitive damages arrived in
American jurisprudence as early as 1784.131 Their singular purpose is
exemplified by California's first case, where they were awarded as "vin-
dictive damages." '132 These damages, which in the writings of Black-
stone, Hammond, or Rutherford, 133 have no sanction, contrast with
enhanced damages that developed later in the law, such as penalties
under the Clayton Antitrust Act.134 Since both antitrust treble damages
and punitive damages have been held mutually exclusive,1 35 the Clayton
Act serves as an appropriate focal point for construing the historical pur-
pose of damage enhancement. The examination reveals that rather than
possessing characteristics comparable to normal enhanced damages pro-
visions, punitive damages more clearly parallel criminal law. The discus-
sion dispels any notion that punitive damages can be justified as
nonpenal.
L Penal-Remedial Distinctions
The well-settled rule in construing a sanction that punishes is that it
is saved from a penal construction if the sanction has any remedial pur-
pose or effect. As stated in Helvering v. Mitchell,1 36 the determinative
criterion is whether the actual damages awarded fully compensate the
130. For example, the same reasoning that distinguishes antitrust treble damages from
criminal fines distinguishes enhanced damages from punitive damages. Antitrust treble dam-
ages under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982), have a partial remedial nature, while puni-
tive damages and criminal fines do not. See infra text accompanying notes 150-55. It should
be noted that the criminality of statutory treble damages provisions repeatedly has been ad-
dressed and rejected. See infra note 139.
131. Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6 (1784) (exemplary damages assessed against de-
fendant who, as a practical joke, placed a "spanish fly" in plaintiff's wine, causing plaintiff to
become ill).
132. Wilson v. Middleton, 2 Cal. 54 (1852). The headnote summing up the case refers to
exemplary damages as "vindictive." Id. at 54. Courts still refer to punitive damages as "vin-
dictive." See Webb's City, Inc. v. Hancur, 144 So. 2d 319, 321 (Fla. 1962).
133. See Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 546, 5 P. 119, 122 (1884). Justice Helm also
points out that punitive damages were "entirely unknown to civil law." Id.
134. Under 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982), Clayton antitrust damages are clearly delineated in
amount and awarded to rectify injury to property. Punitive damages are undefined in limit
and are assessed as punishment for outrageous behavior.
135. For a collection of cases, see Wahba v. H & N Prescriptions Center, Inc., 539 F. Supp.
352, 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
136. 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938).
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plaintiff. '37 If any compensatory purpose can be found in damage en-
hancement, the statute will not be construed as penal.
138
Clayton Act antitrust damages provide a good illustration.
Although they exact some retribution, they have not been regarded as
penal.139 A number of courts have held that the Clayton Act's treble
damages provision is designed to substitute for other, more complex
measures of damages. Moratory interest, for example, is not awarded in
antitrust actions as "an element of damages sustained."'" Treble dam-
ages compensate for that loss and avoid "difficult questions of proof" on
highly abstruse inquiries into the duration and amount of interest.
141
In antitrust litigation, a person or corporation eliminated perma-
nently or effectively from competition will have difficulty establishing the
full amount of damage.'42 But the treble damages provision circumvents
any problems by allowing for "ample" awards and providing an "open
...door of justice" to those suffering actual harm. 143 For instance,
only special damages are pleaded in antitrust actions, though treble dam-
ages may very well serve to redress types of injury that are not compensa-
ble under the compensatory provisions of the antitrust laws.'" While
treble damages have been declared somewhat punitive in nature, their
137. Even where indemnity for loss may be greater than actual damages, a penalty is still
remedial if it can be said the compensation did not represent full value of the loss. Id. at 401.
A fixed civil penalty in addition to criminal fines for the same wrong may be considered reme-
dial if it can be said to reasonably compensate society or the government for damages caused
by the crime. See Rex Trailer v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 153-54 (1956).
138. Helvering, 303 U.S. at 401.
139. The courts have repeatedly held that treble damages under the Clayton Act are non-
penal. See, eg., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397
(1906); Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, 244 F.2d 471, 483 (5th Cir. 1957); United
States v. Countryside Farms, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 1150, 1159 (C.D. Utah 1977).
140. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 80 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd, 409 U.S.
363 (1973) (treble damages adequately compensate plaintiff for moratory interest). Contra 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1982) (prejudgment interest may be awarded for bad faith in antitrust litigation).
141. Hughes, 449 F.2d at 80.
142. The difficulty of measuring damages is illustrated by the case of Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside Theatre Corp., 194 F.2d 846, 854-57 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 942 (1952) (attempt to calculate "[t]he value of the right to continue business, of which
the plaintiff was deprived by the wrongful act of the defendants." 194 F.2d at 855). Treble
damages are provided in antitrust cases to assure injured plaintiffs "'ample damages for the
wrong suffered.'" Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10
(1977) (quoting 51 CONG. REC. 9073 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb)).
143. Treble damages under the Clayton Act were provided only in part to achieve a puni-
tive end. They were primarily designed as a remedy for those injured by illegal antitrust activi-
ties. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 486 n.10.
144. Treble damages under the Clayton Act have a dual function: they cover all damages
suffered by plaintiff and encourage private enforcement of the antitrust laws. Philadelphia
Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 269 F. Supp. 540, 542 (E.D.
Pa. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 931 (1968). Treble damages are intended to redress injury and
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remedial purpose brings them within the rule of Helvering v. Mitchell.
14 5
Similar conclusions have been reached regarding other enhanced
damages.146 Enhanced damages may be assessed in patent infringement
actions, for example, without being construed as criminal.147 The prem-
ise is that an award of compensation does not necessarily reflect actual
damages where the plaintiff has sustained prolonged abridgment of his
rights.148 Another line of reasoning holds that enhanced damages may
be considered "liquidated damages" where they are in the nature of a
fixed fine and serve to cover reasonable costs associated with litigation. 149
On the other hand, punitive damages are purely penal in nature, a
proposition made clear by the majority rule reflected in the Second Re-
statement of Torts.150 They are not construed as serving any remedial
goal.151 While a remedial purpose exists in most cases of statutorily en-
to achieve the social object of antitrust laws. Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 828
(9th Cir. 1963).
145. 303 U.S. 391 (1937). See supra note 137.
146. The typical treble damages provision compensates for losses sustained against prop-
erty rights and thus serves a remedial purpose. See, eg., Rayonier, Inc. v. Polson, 400 F.2d
909, 922 (9th Cir. 1968) (by bringing an action for wrongful cutting and removal of timber
seeking statutorily enhanced damages, "'plaintiffs have declared for double or treble value of
the trees as their measure of damages, instead of single value with interest."' Id. (quoting
McCloskey v. Powell, 138 Pa. 383, 398, 21 A. 148, 150 (1891)); see also Armstrong v. Emerson
Radio & Phonograph Corp., 132 F. Supp. 176, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (patent treble damage
actions survive the plaintiff's death since they compensate for the taking of another's property);
Momand v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 37 F. Supp. 649, 657 (W.D. Okla. 1941)
(Clayton Act antitrust treble damage action is assignable since it remedies injury to business or
property interests).
However, an enhanced damages provision will be construed as purely penal if it has no
remedial effect. See Ashcraft v. Saunders, 251 Or. 139, 142, 444 P.2d 924, 926-27 (1968).
147. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1982). See also Armstrong v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp.,
132 F. Supp. 176, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) ("[p]ublic policy dictates that where the injury is to
property, intangible aspects of the damage claim which relate to the complexities of our indus-
trial society be satisfied by the imposition of additional damages, which though in some aspects
punitive, are inherently remedial").
148. Armstrong, 132 F. Supp. at 179; accord Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons,
Inc., 638 F.2d 661, 663 (3d Cir. 1981) (Clayton Act antitrust treble damages serve as interest
for the loss of use of money and "all other remedial . factors necessary to vindicate the
policies of the underlying substantive law").
149. Rex Trailer v. United States, 350 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1955).
150. RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 908 (1979). "[Tihe purposes of awarding puni-
tive damages, or 'exemplary' damages as they are frequently called, are to punish the person
doing the wrongful act and to discourage him and others from similar conduct in the future."
Id., comment a.
151. Punitive damages are not compensation, they are "private fines." Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). Although Connecticut, Michigan, and New Hampshire
assign a compensatory purpose to punitive damages, courts in those states are emphatic in
their view that the doctrine may not be utilized to punish. See Veselenak v. Smith, 414 Mich.
567, 576-77, 327 N.W.2d 261, 265 (1982) (punitive damages may be awarded to compensate
intangible injury, but must not doubly compensate plaintiffs); Miller v. Drouin, 183 Conn. 189,
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hanced damages, punitive damages justify no compensatory end. 152 In-
deed, punitive damages are considered a mere "windfall" '53 to the
plaintiff and are not favored in law.154 These observations have not been
made about other types of enhanced damages.1 55
2. Matter of Right
By virtue of statutory language, both state and federal courts
156
have interpreted the award of Clayton Act antitrust treble damages as an
absolute right when the plaintiff prevails 6n his cause of action.157 Corre-
spondingly, a plaintiff in a patent infringement action may collect treble
damages for violation of a registered patent.158 While the statutory lan-
guage is vague, courts have interpreted the patent treble damages provi-
sion as a right when the plaintiff proves the defendant's violation was
190, 438 A.2d 863, 864 (1981) (punitive damages may not be utilized to punish a defendant).
New Hampshire allows punitive damages to enhance a compensatory award, but disallows
them for punishment and deterrence purposes. See Vratsenes v. N.H. Auto Inc., 112 N.H. 71,
73, 289 A.2d 66, 68 (1972).
Four states-Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington-disallow punitive
damages completely. See Breaux v. Simon, 235 La. 453, 104 So.2d 168 (1958); O'Reilly v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940); Miller v. Kingsley, 194 Neb. 123, 230
N.W.2d 472 (1975); and Conrad v. Lakewood Gen. Hosp., 67 Wash. 2d. 934, 410 P.2d 785
(1966). However, a bill recently has been introduced in the Louisiana House that would im-
pose on insurers a duty of good faith and fair dealing, authorizing punitive damages for arbi-
trary or intentional violation of the duty. H. 760, 1984 Sess. (1984 LA.). A Senate bill would
authorize punitive damages for fraudulent, malicious, wanton, or reckless conduct. S. 560,
1984 Sess. (1984 LA.).
152. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 350.
153. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 84 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 362 (Ind. 1982).
154. Punitive damages are not favored in the law because of their "penal nature." Ham-
mond v. North Am. Asbestos Corp., 97 IlI. 2d 195, 211, 454 N.E.2d 210, 219 (1983); see also
Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 750, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 242 (1980).
155. Indeed, enhanced damages are favored. See supra note 147.
156. See, e.g., Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum, Inc., 148 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir. 1945);
Uneedus v. California Shoppers, Inc., 86 Cal. App. 3d 932, 942, 150 Cal. Rptr. 596, 602
(1978).
157. The treble award is mandated on the face of the Clayton Act whenever actual dam-
ages are proved. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) provides:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the dam-
ages by him sustained. ...
See also Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum, Inc., 148 F.2d at 581 (treble damages "automati-
cally" follow actual damages).
158. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1982). When actual damages are awarded, "the court may increase
the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed." Id.
Winter 1985] PENAL DIMENSIONS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 263
willful and intentional. 5 9 These two examples reflect the general rule
that where a plaintiff prevails on a statutory cause of action, enhanced
damages, where available, will be permitted."6 This rule parallels the
reasoning holding treble damages to be nonpenal: if they compensate,
then the right necessarily must exist.
161
In contrast, punitive damages are not considered a right in any juris-
diction.' 62 Such an award rests totally within the jury's discretion.
163
For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that it is never error
not to award punitive damages.' 6 Questioning the propriety of the doc-
trine, the United States Supreme Court has noted that juries may employ
punitive damages inappropriately to punish unpopular defendants.165 In-
stead of uniform application of a rule, punitive damage awards result in a
farrago of erratic verdicts lacking even-handed justice.'
66
Further, unlike the general treble damages proceeding in which a
jury verdict on enhanced damages is advisory only, 167 a jury's decision
not to award punitive damages constitutes a final determination of that
issue.' 68 A fascinating paradox thus materializes. In a criminal proceed-
ing, an acquittal by the jury forever bars prosecution or appeal by the
government.' 69 Remarkably, the identical rule applies to punitive dam-
ages proceedings. Like criminal procedure, a jury decision that punitive
159. The plaintiff is "entitled" to enhanced damages where the breach is willful, inten-
tional, and not in good faith. Saf-Gard Prod., Inc. v. Service Parts, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 996,
1011 (D. Ariz. 1980); Jenn-Air Corp. v. Penn Ventilator Co., 394 F. Supp. 665, 676 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (knowingly, intentionally, and willfully infringing patent "entitles" plaintiff to treble
damages).
160. See, eg., Jenn-Air Corp., 394 F. Supp. at 676.
161. See supra note 159. The rights may be limited, however. See Trio Process Corp. v. L.
Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 638 F.2d 661, 663-64 (3d Cir. 1981) (if damages for patent infringement
are found to be punitive, interest may be computed only on primary damages).
162. See infra note 242.
163. See infra note 316.
164. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 301-02, 294 N.W.2d 437, 458 (1980).
165. Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 50 n.14 (1979).
166. The Ninth Circuit is in accord. In rejecting the contention that statutory denial of
punitive damages in wrongful death actions violates equal protection, the court stated: "The
frequently violent and dramatic circumstances of accidents that lead to wrongful death actions
not only would pose this danger of extreme awards, but also might increase the temptation for
a jury to award punitive damages even when concrete elements of fraudulent or intentional
wrongdoing are absent." In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1980).
167. White v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 509 F.2d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 1975) (patent infringement).
168. "A plaintiff is entitled to [punitive] damages only after the jury, in the exercise of its
untrammeled discretion, has made the award." Lewis v. Hayes, 165 Cal. 527, 533, 132 P.
1022, 1024 (1913).
169. "[T]he plea of autrefoits acquit... is grounded on this universal maxim of the com-
mon law of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for
the same offence." Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) (quoting 4 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *335).
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damages liability shall not extend to the defendant for his alleged acts is
conclusive and unappealable. 170 Thus, while courts17 1 and commenta-
tors172 assert that punitive damages are not penal, they treat them in
theory and practice like criminal punishment. Unlike a criminal defend-
ant, however, a punitive damages defendant faces an exaggerated course
of procedural hurdles on his way to exoneration. 173 Additionally, there
is still great judicial reluctance to reduce punitive damages liability on a
defendant's appeal;17 4 a number of states refuse remittitur absolutely.
175
3. Relationship to Actual Damages
Treble damages are not awarded absent a showing of actual dam-
ages. 176 The rule is similar for other statutorily enhanced damages17 7 and
is consistent with the reasoning that such damages are awarded to com-
pensate for property losses rather than intangible personal losses. If no
170. Even where liability is clear, awarding or withholding punitive damages is the jury's
sole domain. See Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 801, 197 P.2d 713, 719
(1948).
171. Campus Sweater & Sportwear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr., 515 F. Supp. 64, 108 n.129
(D.S.C. 1979) ('The imposition of punitive damage awards, though penal in nature, does not
approach the severity of criminal sanctions."); Unified School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp.,
6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 356, 629 P.2d 196, 206 (1981) (though punitive damages are "penal in
nature," they do "not approach the severity of criminal sanctions and [do] not demand the
same safeguards as do criminal prosecutions").
172. Commentators generally refuse to acknowledge the criminality of punitive damages,
asserting they are not as severe a sanction as penal punishment. See Mallor & Roberts, supra
note 53, at 644-45; Comment, supra note 3, at 410.
173. The punitive damages defendant can be found liable on a preponderance of the evi-
dence; has the disadvantage of having prejudicial information concerning his wealth intro-
duced at trial before he is adjudged guilty; can be compelled to testify against himself; and can
be punished multiply for the same wrong. But see infra notes 355-56 (for the states requiring
higher burdens of proof; Comment, Pretrial Discovery of Net Worth in Punitive Damages
Cases, 54 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1141, 1144 (1981) (discussing effect of pretrial discovery of defend-
ant's wealth).
174. See supra note 123. A finding of civil liability need only be supported by "any sub-
stantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which supports the jury's conclusion." Beck
v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 347, 354, 126 Cal. Rptr. 602, 606 (1976).
On the other hand, a finding of criminal liability depends on "whether reasonable minds could
conclude that the evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis of the accused's innocence."
United States v. Warner, 441 F.2d 821, 825 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971).
175. See the collection ofjurisdictions at 22 AM JUR. 2D, Damages § 446 n.12 (1965).
176. To recover treble damages, the plaintiff must prove the "fact of damage" from injury
to his business or property interest due to a violation of antitrust laws. Response of N.C., Inc.
v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1320 (5th Cir. 1976).
177. See, eg., 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1982) (the statute on its face requires actual damages before
enhancement may be made); CAL. CIV. CODE § 54.3 (West 1984) (three times the amount of
actual damages arising from interference with the rights of physically disabled persons); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3346 (West 1970) (three times actual damages arising from wrongful injury to
trees).
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cognizable injury to property merits compensatory damages, double or
treble damages cannot be justified. 7 '
Punitive damages, however, can be awarded on a showing of nomi-
nal damages. 179 They have been assessed in addition to verdicts of one
dollar,180 six cents,18" and no actual damages at all.'8 2 This result is in
harmony with the doctrine's goal of punishing outrageous conduct rather
than compensating injury. 83 As one federal court pointed out, the need
to protect the public's rights controls regardless of whether actual dam-
age was sustained.1
84
Unlike the treatment of double or treble damages, most jurisdictions
have not delineated measurements or a multiples framework to guide pu-
nitive damages juries.'85 A court may simply instruct a jury to deter-
mine the extent to which a defendant is monetarily liable for
punishment. 86 Thus, rather than determine whether the plaintiff has
178. Only nominal damages are available in antitrust actions if no specific injury is shown.
United Exhibitors, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Distrib. Corp., 31 F. Supp. 316, 317
(W.D. Pa. 1940). Actual injury must be proved, and compensatory damages must be awarded
before treble damages will be upheld. Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580,
582 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945). To qualify for treble damages under the
Clayton Act, there must be injury to business or property by reason of defendant's violation of
antitrust laws. See J. voN KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUsT LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 81.02[2][][iii] (1984).
179. The authorities are split on the issue. See Annot., 17 A.L.R. 542-45 (2d ed. 1951).
Since punitive damages are assessed to punish the defendant, thereby vindicating public policy
rather than any interests of the plaintiff, it is the nature of the act and not the dollar amount of
harm that is decisive. Thus nominal damages are considered sufficient to support punitive
assessments. See Kent v. City of Buffalo, 61 Misc. 2d 142, 304 N.Y.S. 2d 949 (1969), rev'd on
other grounds, 29 N.Y.2d 818, 277 N.E.2d 669, 327 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1971).
180. E.g., Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (libel action awarding a
total of three dollars in nominal damages and $175,000 punitive damages against three
defendants).
181. Toomey v. Farley, 2 N.Y.2d 71, 138 N.E.2d 221, 156 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1956) (defam-
ation).
182. Parnell v. Continental Casualty Co., 146 Cal. App. 3d 483, 194 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1983)
(breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in an insurance contract-trial
court order for new trial upheld).
183. Authority is split on the issue. Compare Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal.
App. 3d 740, 751, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 243 (1980) (requiring both a reasonable relation to
actual damages and that punitive damages not be excessive to the amount of harm caused) with
Kent v. City of Buffalo, 61 Misc. 2d 142, 304 N.Y.S. 2d 949 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 29
N.Y.2d 818, 277 N.E.2d 669, 327 N.Y.S. 2d 653 (1971) (no need for actual damages or rela-
tion of compensatory damages to punitive damages).
184. Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 367 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
185. "There is no fixed standard for the measurement of exemplary or punitive damages
." See the collection of cases at 25 C.J.S. Damages, § 126(1)-(4) (1966 & Supp. 1983).
186. Id. As the Nevada Supreme Court said in Tahoe Village Realty v. DeSmet, 95 Nev.
131, 135, 590 P.2d 1158, 1161 (1979): "[IThe assessing of punitive damages is wholly subjec-
tive. There are no objective standards by which the monetary amount can be calculated."
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OUARTERLY
proved damages to a personal or property right, the punitive damages
jury decides whether the defendant should be penalized financially for his
behavior and, if so, to what extent. The focus on the defendant's culpa-
bility and liability for punishment, instead of damage or injury to the
plaintiff,18 7 constitutes a unique exception to tort law.
188
4. Survival and Assignment
There is no survival of penal actions at common law.189 On the
other hand, enhanced damages provisions-being remedial in purpose
and effect-do survive since the action is not against a deceased
tortfeasor.190 Rather, the action is against his estate, which may have
benefited wrongfully at the plaintiff's expense.191 Punitive damages
claims, however, do not survive.1 92 Once again, the irony is that punitive
damages are treated historically and theoretically like criminal fines. The
general rule is that a personal representative cannot be forced to step into
the shoes of a deceased tortfeasor's punitive damages liability any more
than he can be made to accept vicarious criminal liability for the
wrong. 193
187. Punitive damages are assessed against a defendant rather than awarded to the plain-
tiff. See, e.g., Caple v. Raynel Campers, Inc., 90 Nev. 341, 344, 526 P.2d 334, 336-37 (1974).
"[Tihe concept of punitive damages rests upon a presumed public policy to punish a wrong-
doer for his act. . . ... Id. See also 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 240 (1965).
188. Tort remedies, with the exception of punitive damages, provide relief for some damage
threatened or suffered. See generally D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 1-3 (1973).
189. Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76, 80 (1884).
190. Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 1942).
191. Prosser points out that early American courts adopted the rule that an action against
a decedent's estate survived where the estate otherwise would be unjustly enriched and "the
action could be maintained as one of quasi-contract restitution." W. PROSSER, LAW OF
Tonrs 899 (4th ed. 1971). The modern trend is that the fortuitous event of death should not
extinguish a claim that legitimately can be asserted against the estate of the tortfeasor. Id. at
901.
192. At common law, no action against the tortfeasor survived. Henshaw v. Miller, 58
U.S. (17 How.) 212 (1854). The common law rule has been altered by statute so that today
only the punitive damages claim does not survive the tortfeasor's death. See, e.g., CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 573 (West. Supp. 1984) (survival of all actions except punitive damages claims);
Wis. STAT. ANNOT. § 895.02 (West 1983) (no survival of punitive damages claim against dece-
dent's estate). Since punitive damages are designed to punish the defendant, no purpose is
served by assessing them against his estate or heirs upon his death. Abatement of the claim is
not unjust since such damages are assessed against a tortfeasor for his personal wrong and not
for the benefit of the plaintiff. Evans v. Gibson, 220 Cal. 476, 489-90, 31 P.2d 389, 395 (1934)
("Punitive damages serve no purpose after the wrongdoer's death."); Wangen v. Ford Motor
Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 311, 294 N.W.2d 437, 463 (1980); Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319
N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn. 1982).
193. The criminal law imposes punishment on those transgressing social barriers of accept-
able behavior, both to prevent further misbehavior and to deter others similarly situated.
Those who have "lived up to the social standards of the criminal law" have necessitated no
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A brief comment on the history of tort action survival is even more
revealing. At common law, the death of the tortfeasor abated every
cause of action. 194 Eventually, the exception developed that actions for
torts affecting property rights survived. 195 Torts affecting the person,
however, survive only by virtue of statute.1 96 While it is not certain why
this divergence in the law occurred, 197 it is most likely attributable to the
early common law that treated personal torts and crimes identically.
Since criminal actions abated with the defendant's death, so did the per-
sonal tort. 198 Prosser attributed this phenomenon to "the development
of the tort remedy as an adjunct and incident to criminal punishment in
the old appeal of felony and the action of trespass which succeeded it."199
Thus, since a dead person could not be punished, personal tort liability
disappeared with death.2 °° However, at least half of American jurisdic-
tions now permit a personal injury action to survive the death of the
tortfeasor.2 10 Nevertheless, the uniform rule is that a punitive damages
claim related to a personal injury still abates with the defendant's de-
mise.20 2 Because punitive damages are considered retributional, like
criminal penalties, they serve no purpose after the wrongdoer's death.2 °3
While it may be argued that punitive damages still serve some minimal
level of deterrence, once the death of the malefactor occurs, there simply
is nothing left to deter.2°4 Attempts to castigate the heirs of the accused
would be a gross deviation from civil or criminal justice.20 5
reason for punishment. Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 580 n.1, 155 A.2d 825, 827
n.1 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 848 (1960).
194. Henshaw v. Miller, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 212 (1884). See also 1 AM. JUR. 2DAbatement,
Survival, and Revival § 47 (1962) (death of party abating action).
195. The reason for this distinction is that a dead person cannot be punished, whereas his
property, remaining in existence, can compensate for injury done to another's property inter-
ests. Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 128 F.2d at 649. See also 1 AM. JUR.
2D Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 51 (1962).
196. See, eg., Cort v. Steen, 36 Cal.2d 437, 439, 244 P.2d 723, 723-24 (1950) (the common
law maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona applies absent a statute to the contrary).
197. D. DOBBS, supra note 188, at 551; W. PROSSER, supra note 191, at 900.
198. D. DOBBS, supra note 188, at 551.
199. W. PROSSER, supra note 191, at 898.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 900.
202. See supra note 192.
203. Nor may punitive damages be assessed against innocent persons. Thompson v. Estate
of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d at 408 ("to punish [the decedent's] estate. . . would be to ignore the
entire purpose of punitive damages").
204. Id. ("Obviously, if the tortfeasor is dead, no need exists for either punishment or
deterrence.").
205. See supra note 193.
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The development of such legal distinctions marshals the argument
that punitive damages are a misplaced criminal sanction. For if they
served any justifiable need of the victim-something more than pure ret-
ribution-the evolution of personal tort actions would not have excluded
such claims. Thus, the mere fact that symmetry between criminal law
and punitive damages has not disappeared, contrary to all other instances
in tort law, indicates that punitive damages never made a complete tran-
sition to civil law.
In accord are the related concepts that punitive damages claims can-
not be assigned absent a statute and that any punitive damages claim
must be prosecuted in the plaintiff's own behalf.206 Since the wrong is
personal and affects only the victim and society, no other person can
have a legitimate interest in prosecuting for his own benefit. Similarly,
in a criminal proceeding, only the state has a right to prosecute.2 °7 How-
ever, other types of enhanced damages, such as those provided by the
Clayton Act, can be assigned because they remedy injured property inter-
ests, rather than serve penal ends.
20 8
In summary, like the "infamous punishment" cases, the history of
the practical implications of punitive damages discloses a substantive re-
lation to criminal law. The wrong addressed under punitive damages is
unlike those wrongs that create a right to enhanced damages. While the
punitive damages defendant is treated differently than the enhanced dam-
ages defendant, he also shares a special relationship with the criminal
defendant: both are punished in order to deter future misconduct. Puni-
tive damages apparently satisfy the second Kennedy factor. The reason-
ing that justifies the absence of safeguards under enhanced damages
provisions like the Clayton Act does not legitimize current punitive dam-
ages procedures. As the Ninth Circuit has stated, the punitive damages
doctrine is "a hybrid of the civil and criminal law. ' '209 It is an inevitable
conclusion that punitive damages constitute an orphan of the penal law
abandoned in the development of distinctions between criminal and civil
206. People v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 283, 287, 507 P.2d 1400, 1403, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192,
195 (1973). The suit must be prosecuted on the insured's behalf and only he is entitled to the
punitive damages award. French v. Orange County Inv. Corp., 125 Cal. App. 587, 591, 13
P.2d 1046, 1048 (1932). In an action by an assignee on a debt assignment, "a judgment ren-
dered in [the assignor's] favor with regard to punitive damages cannot be sustained." Dugar v.
Happy Tiger Records, Inc., 41 Cal. App. 3d 811, 819, 116 Cal. Rptr. 412, 417 (1974).
207. "An offense which amounts to a crime is pursued by the sovereign . Bergman
v. State, 187 Wash. 622, 625, 60 P.2d 699, 701 (1936) (emphasis added).
208. Gerr v. Schering, 256 F. Supp. 572, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Health Care Equalization v.
Iowa Medical Soc'y, 501 F. Supp. 970, 977 (S.D. Iowa 1980).
209. In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1322 (9th Cir. 1980).
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jurisprudence.21°
5. Bankruptcy
The omnipresence and inseparability of criminal logic from the pu-
nitive damages doctrine is reinforced by the federal bankruptcy laws.
The Bankruptcy Code does not discharge government fines, penalties,
and forfeitures where they are purely penal in nature.211 Only where a
compensatory purpose addresses "actual pecuniary loss" will the penalty
be discharged.212
Technically, to be excepted from discharge, a debt must be "willful
and malicious. 21 3  For purposes of the federal bankruptcy statutes,
"willful" is defined as voluntary, 214 while "malice" equals the intentional
doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse.215 Thus, given the
punitive purpose of punitive damages, the goals of punitive damages
would not be furthered by asserting them against trustees in bank-
ruptcy.2" 6 Nor should third party creditors suffer for the bankrupt's
punishment by allowing their interest to be discharged.2 17 The punitive
damages tortfeasor and the criminal defendant alone must bear the bur-
den of judgments against them.
Another interesting parallel in the federal bankruptcy law relates to
the discharge of criminal fines involving restitution.21 ' An example is In
re Newton.21 9 In Newton, a debtor under Chapter 13 proceedings sought
to discharge a $10,000 restitutionary claim he had been ordered to pay to
the victim of a large livestock theft and fraud scheme. The restitution
was a parole condition, subject to setoff if the victim proceeded against
210. See generally Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 548, 5 P. 119, 124 (1884) (noting that in
a punitive damages proceeding, juries may turn to the domain of criminal law and consider the
nature of the public wrong).
211. There is no discharge of a penal debt under federal bankruptcy laws. 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(7) (1982) provides in part that "to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty or forfei-
ture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual
pecuniary loss [the debt may not be discharged] ...."
212. See the discussion on the discharge of fines and penalties in COLLIER BANKRuPTcy
MANUAL (MB) § 523.17 (1983); In re Tauscher, 26 Bankr. 99 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982).
213. Coen v. Zick, 458 F.2d 326, 330 (9th Cir. 1972); National Homes Corp. v. Lester
Indus., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 644, 647 (W.D. Va. 1972). A debt for damage arising from willful
and malicious injury to another is not discharged. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1982).
214. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485 (1904).
215. Id. at 485-86.
216. In re GAC Corp. v. Callahan, 681 F.2d 1295, 1301 n.5 (11th Cir. 1982).
217. Id.
218. Depending on state penal laws, court-ordered restitution may not be dischargeable as
a debt under federal bankruptcy laws. See generally In re Tauscher, 26 Bankr. 99 (Bankr. E.D.
Wis. 1982); In re Newton, 15 Bankr. 708 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
219. 15 Bankr. 708 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
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him in a civil suit under Georgia law. Since this arrangement allowed
the victim to proceed against the defendant to enforce his right to restitu-
tion, the court held that it created a creditor-debtor relationship and that
restitution equaled a debt. The question then became whether such a
debt could be discharged under bankruptcy. The court, citing legislative
history, stated that "[t]he bankruptcy laws are not a haven for criminal
offenders. . . . Criminal actions and proceedings may proceed in spite
of bankruptcy laws."220 The court concluded that restitution, assessed as
part of a penalty subject to parole condition, created a "debt" which,
unlike other debts, could not be discharged by bankruptcy.221 When this
reasoning is compared with the logic preventing discharge of punitive
damages, the result is imposing. Like restitution under Georgia law, pu-
nitive damages constitute a debt. Yet they are not dischargeable because
neither the punitive damages defendant nor the criminal defendant can
use bankruptcy proceedings to escape the consequences of intentional
wrongdoing. While bankruptcy laws provide economic efficiency and
encourage private enterprise, they do not shield punishment.
Ironically, bankruptcy enhances the punitive effect of a punitive
damages award. Since a punitive judgment is assessed on the basis of the
defendant's wealth,222 after bankruptcy the award ceases to bear any re-
lation to the defendant's financial condition. The bankruptcy transforms
the punitive damages burden into a civil enigma, a punishment based in
part on defendant's wealth that no longer bears any relation to that fac-
tor. Although the courts have stated that punitive damages are not in-
tended to bankrupt a defendant, the bankrupt punitive damages
defendant ultimately may have been better off with a criminal conviction.
There, at least, suspension of punishment is available.
C. Scienter
The third Kennedy test is whether the sanction "comes into play
only on a finding of scienter ... ."223 All jurisdictions require some
element of "knowing wrongdoing" to justify awards of punitive dam-
220. Id. at 710 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 342-43 (1977)).
221. 15 Bankr. at 710.
222. Those states adopting the "reasonable relation" rule require the punitive damages
judgment to be proportional to the actual damages so that the defendant is not over- or under-
punished to achieve the desired level of deterrence. See Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110
Cal. App. 3d 740, 750-51, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 243 (1980). If the defendant is later declared
bankrupt, the punitive damages judgment, because it cannot be discharged, may become an
insuperable burden with a lasting effect worse than the wrong for which he was originally
punished.
223. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168.
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ages.2 24 However, since remedial and civil penalty statutes are often
found to be nonpenal,225 a review of the Kennedy test and applicable
cases is necessary.
The Kennedy opinion cited two authorities supporting the "scien-
ter" test.226 The first case, Helwig v. United States,227 involved statutory
assessment of "extra" duties228 for undervaluation of import goods equal
to or greater than forty percent of the goods' value.22 9 The excessive
penalty, combined with an inference of fraud, was held to serve one pur-
pose only-punishment of the importer.230 As a result, the extra duties
were penal, and criminal procedural safeguards were mandated.231
The second authority was the Child Labor Tax Case.232 That case
involved the imposition of a ten percent tax on the net profit of any busi-
ness that employed a child fourteen years old or younger unless there was
a reasonable mistake or belief as to the child's true age.233 Concluding
that the "tax" was in effect a "heavy exaction for a departure from a
detailed and specific course of conduct, ' 234 the Court held it to be penal.
The alleged tax adopted "the criteria of wrongdoing and impos[ed] its
principal consequence on those who transgress[ed] its standard" of
knowingly departing from prescribed courses of conduct.235
224. A proscribed mental state is required to support an award of punitive damages-a
state of mind showing a conscious or criminal indifference to the rights of others. See D.
DOBBS, supra note 188, at 205-06.
225. See Charney, supra note 86, at 481-83 (civil penalties are not criminal when regulatory
in nature). See also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) (holding that a civil penalty
assessed under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act survived the Kennedy tests and was
not penal in nature); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 518
F. 2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975) (penalties assessed under the Occupational Safety and Health Act are
not penal since the statute regulates rather than reprimands. The opinion lists one hundred
similar civil penalty statutes. Id. at 1003-09).
226. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168 n.24. The cases cited were Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S.
20 (1921); Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605 (1902).
227. 188 U.S. 605 (1902).
228. Id. at 610.
229. Id. at 609-10. The appellant in the case had nearly $10,000 in penalties assessed
against him after a United States appraiser determined that the market value of the wood pulp
he imported was 27% greater than he had declared. The actual duty was $1,679.20, but the
penalty amounted to $9,067.68. Id. at 606-07. Although there had been no intent to defraud
the government, the fine remained intact. Id. at 611.
230. Id. at 612.
231. At issue in Helwig was whether the defendant had the right to original jurisdiction in
district court, as opposed to circuit court, because circuit courts had no jurisdiction to hear
claims for penalties under United States customs laws. Id. at 608. Since the fine was held to be
penal in nature, the district court had jurisdiction. Id. at 619.
232. 259 U.S. 20 (1921).
233. Id. at 34-35.
234. Id. at 36.
235. Id. at 38.
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The crux of both opinions is that the "taxes" or "duties" were not
legitimate exercises of government power with incidental regulatory ef-
fects. The legislation effectively punished the presumed or actual mental
states combined with forbidden acts. As the Court in the Child Labor
Tax Case lamented, "[s]cienter is associated with penalties not with taxes
[or duties]." '236 In both cases, the size of the fine combined with the ele-
ment of scienter rendered the acts penal.237
A plausible argument arises from this conclusion: while punitive
damages are premised on forbidden scienters such as malice,238 the logic
that finds an element of scienter 239 in nonpenal intentional torts or civil
penalty statutes arguably may find application to the punitive damages
doctrine.
Initially, it must be conceded that any statute allowing a civil pen-
alty may be both remedial and penal since such penalties remedy injury
as well as further penal objectives.24 But while a statutory penalty may
be considered punitive to the defendant and remedial to the plaintiff,2"1
punitive damages must be examined in light of the effect on the defend-
ant because the plaintiff has no right to such damages.242
Federal decisions applying the Kennedy "scienter" criterion have
236. Id. at 37.
237. Under the statute in Helwig, if fraud was presumed and not rebutted by the defendant,
total forfeiture of his undervalued imported goods constituted the penalty. 188 U.S. at 612.
Enhancing the penalty on the basis of scienter logically supported the Court's conclusion that
the statute's purpose was to punish the defendant, rather than serve some legitimate nonpuni-
tive governmental purpose.
238. See infra note 276.
239. Certain torts require minimum mental states before liability can attach. For example,
assault, battery, trespass, and false imprisonment require some element of intent. See W.
PROSSER, supra note 191, at 31-32. Illustrative is the development of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Liability will not attach absent "(1) outrageous conduct by the defendant;
(2) the defendant's intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing
emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4)
actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous con-
duct." Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 394, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 88
(1970). To establish liability for intentional torts, the conduct causing injury must be extreme,
outrageous and intentionally or recklessly committed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 46 (1965). Although this mental element resembles that required for punitive damages liabil-
ity, the fact that compensation is the immediate objective removes the tort from Helwig and
the Child Labor Tax Case where the effect and purpose of the penalties was not wholly
compensatory.
240. Riggs v. Government Employees Fin. Corp., 623 F.2d 68, 69-72 (9th Cir. 1980).
241. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667 (1892).
242. White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Mont. 1983) (there is a constitutional right to
recover for actual injury, but no constitutional right to punitive damages). See also supra note
187.
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concluded that knowledge triggers the scienter test.24 3 Two cases con-
struing the Federal Water Pollution Control Act2 " illustrate this point.
An early lower federal court interpretation in United States v. LeBeouf
Brothers Towing Co.24 held the act penal, based not only on the scienter
test, but also on composite answers to all seven Kennedy inquiries.24
The case involved the penalty section of the act, which permitted a fine of
up to $10,000 for knowingly engaging in illegal discharges of oil into wa-
terways.24 7 However, in United States v. General Motors Corp. ,248 an-
other district court pointed out that the "knowing" requirement was
removed later from the penalty section of the act. Elimination of the
knowledge requirement represented a "significant distinction" between
the two cases, thus permitting a nonpenal interpretation.249 In addition
to the lack of knowledge in General Motors, the nonpenal purpose of the
statute also was supported by nonexcessive fines, tailored to fit the partic-
ular situation, and the defendant's ability to absorb the penalty.250
It should be emphasized that the mental state under the Kennedy
"scienter" factor encompasses that frame of mind embraced in the crimi-
nal "conclusory scienter concept. 25 1 But as the Fifth Circuit in Atlas
243. If defendant's knowledge of the wrong committed is relevant only to the issue of miti-
gation, then there is no initial scienter factor to trigger the third Kennedy test. See Atlas
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm'n, 518 F.2d 990, 1001-02 (5th Cir. 1975),
aftid, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). A requirement of "knowingly" as a predicate to liability may
indicate penal purpose. United States v. General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1151, 1162 (D.
Conn. 1975), but when the fine is aimed at actual injury and damage rather than the act itself,
it is regulatory in nature rather than penal. 403 F. Supp. at 1162.
244. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-76 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
245. 377 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 537 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430
U.S. 987 (1977).
246. 377 F. Supp. at 563.
247. Formerly, 33 U.S.C. § 1161(B)(5) provided in part:
Any owner or operator of any vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility from which
oil is knowingly discharged in violation of paragraph (2) of this subsection shall be
assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard
is operating of not more than $10,000 ....
(emphasis added) (superseded by Pub. L. No. 92-500 § 2, 86 Stat. 816 (1972)).
248. 403 F. Supp. 1151 (1975).
249. Id. at 1162.
250. Id. at 1163. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (Supp. 1983). That section provides in
part that:
In determining the amount of the penalty, or the amount agreed upon in compro-
mise, the appropriateness of such penalty to the size of the business of the owner or
operator charged, the effect on the owner or operator's ability to continue in business,
and the gravity of the violation, shall be considered by such Secretary.
251. Atlas Roofing, 518 F.2d at 1001. Presumably, the court in Atlas Roofing was referring
to conduct classified as malum in se. Such acts, if statutorily proscribed, may result in crimi-
nal punishment without proof of intent because the intent is imputed. See, eg., Griffin v. State,
578 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Tenn. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 854 (1979) (driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol is an illegal act malum in se that presumes criminal intent of the actor).
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Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission252 elo-
quently noted in construing a civil penalty provision under the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act, making available the defenses of reasonable
belief or mistake does "not orbit to the apogee of a suspected scienter
factor," and such excuses are distant from the limitations of criminal
law. 53 For example, under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, a
penalty assessment takes into consideration the size of the employer's
business, gravity of the violation, history of previous violations, and the
employer's good faith.254 While the factors mitigating liability are far
broader than those available in criminal law,25 5 good faith is not usually
a mitigating factor where the criminal defendant makes a mistake. For
example, in People v. Young 56 the New York Court of Appeals stated
the general rule that a mistake of good faith belief is not enough to exon-
erate a defendant from criminal liability. 57 In that case the victim was
held liable for assaulting police officers whom he believed to be "hoods"
assaulting an innocent victim.258 A mistaken but reasonable belief could
not mitigate criminal culpability. Thus, the critical distinction between a
civil and criminal penalty is the extent to which the actual or presumed
mental state, intent, or knowledge controls assessment of liability.
Both the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Occupational
Safety and Health Act illustrate what constitutes a civil penalty as op-
posed to a criminal penalty. Under those statutes, knowledge or good
faith affect penalty assessments only to the extent of reducing dam-
ages. 59 The defendant suffers no repercussion for any mental state, and
252. 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975).
253. See id. at 1001-02. Knowledge is not required to establish liability for violations of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act. It is enough if the exercise of reasonable diligence would
indicate a safety violation. See 29 U.S.C. § 6660) (1975).
254. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(i) (1975).
255. The gravity and number of violations would be a consideration in sentencing. See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West Supp. 1984) (gravity of offense elevating the degree of
punishment); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1984) (sentence enhancement for repeat
offenders); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (b) (West Supp. 1984) (mitigation affecting sentencing).
256. 11 N.Y.2d 274, 183 N.E.2d 319, 229 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 275, 183 N.E.2d at 319-20, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
259. The Occupational Safety and Health Act provides:
The Commission shall have authority to assess all civil penalties provided in this
section, giving due consideration to the appropriateness of the penalty with respect to
the size of the business of the employer being charged, the gravity of the violation,
the good faith of the employer, and the history of previous violations. 29 U.S.C.
§ 666 (j) (1982).
Similarly, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments provide: "The amount of
such penalty shall not exceed $50,000, except that where the United States can show that such
discharge was the result of willful negligence or willful misconduct within the privity and
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the act may even be mitigated or excused by the size of his business26 ° or
his inability to pay.26 Although this disregard for a defendant's mental
state is not conclusive on whether the statutes are penal,262 it does result
in negative findings on the scienter issue.
Under the reasoning of either Atlas Roofing or General Motors, a
punitive damages sanction would be penal. The sanction requires a clear
finding of a proscribed mental state, such as malice, and the financial
status of the defendant does not mitigate the initial liability assessment.
Also, in most jurisdictions, evidence of wealth is not a prerequisite to a
punitive damages assessment.263
Like criminal liability, punitive damages liability addresses culpabil-
ity to determine whether punishment should be inflicted. 264 The unity of
act and intent controls,265 and wealth is irrelevant to the issue of whether
punishment is justified.266 Correspondingly, initial liability for punitive
damages is determined in identical fashion to criminal law: did the de-
fendant commit the act with the requisite state of mind?
2 67
The element of scienter also distinguishes punitive damages liability
from ordinary tort law. Aside from punitive damages, compensation for
knowledge of the owner, operator, or person in charge, such penalty shall not exceed
$250,000." 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (b)(6)(B) (1982).
260. See supra note 250.
261. Id. In contrast, the general rule relating to punitive damages is that wealth may be
considered in assessing punishment, although it is not a prerequisite to assessing such damages.
See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 126(3) (1966 & Supp. 1984). However, "the fact finder is not re-
quired to consider the wealth of the defendant as paramount. His decision to award punitive
damages should be based on the 'enormity of the wrong and the necessity of preventing similar
wrongs.'" E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 551 F.2d 1026, 1036 (5th Cir. 1977)
(quoting Loch Ridge Constr. Co. v. Barra, 291 Ala. 312, 320, 280 So. 2d 745, 751 (1973)).
262. The statute may dictate a penal finding on a different Kennedy factor.
263. See supra note 261.
264. See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 37 (1981). The degree of culpability determines
whether, and to what extent, the defendant is liable for delineated crimes and punishments.
See People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290, 637 P.2d 279, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1981) (importance of
examination into the actor's mental state to sustain a charge of murder).
265. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1970) providing that "[i]n every crime or
public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal
negligence."
266. "A cardinal principle of the Anglo-American legal system is that the wealth of the
parties should have no effect on the administration of the law." See Comment, supra note 173,
at 1154 (citing Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N.Y. 73, 103, 52 N.E. 679, 690 (1899)).
267. Assessing punitive damages is a two step process. First, liability must be established
by showing that the challenged conduct involved "some element of outrage similar to that
usually found in crime." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment b (1979). Once
liability is determined, the jury may assess the amount of damages by taking into account other
considerations besides the act itself. Id. at comment e.
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injury is the focus of any civil damages proceeding. 268 Even where a
damages award rests on the finding of an intentional tort, culpability is
determined only for purposes of compensation. 269 Furthermore, while
tort damages were originally incident to criminal prosecution,270 each
remedy developed to achieve a different end.271 Unlike the usual tort
remedies, however, punitive damages are assessed for a "character of
outrage frequently associated with crime."'272 The action justifying puni-
tive damages requires "more than the mere commission of a tort."2 73
The defendant must have acted oppressively, with malice, with an evil
motive, or wickedly.274 The defendant's state of mind towards the plain-
tiff separates punitive damages liability from all other tort damages.275
Conversely, intentional torts do not require any ill will on the defendant's
part.276 Unlike proceedings under civil penalty statutes, a punitive dam-
ages proceeding examines the defendant's motives and conduct. A de-
268. Compensatory damages are based on the nature of the wrong, while punitive damages
address the nature of the actor's conduct. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 275,
294 N.W.2d 437, 446 (1980). Compensatory damages represent a "substantial relief" to rem-
edy a loss measurable in money. D. DOBBS, supra note 188, at 135.
269. For instance, in the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the element of
intent merely determines whether damages will be awarded, but does not affect the extent of
recovery itself. See supra note 239.
270. W. PROSSER, supra note 191, at 8.
271. Id. at 335.
272. Id. at 8. See Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 80, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (1965) (punitive
damages serve to fulfill the inadequacies of the criminal law).
273. W. PROSSER, supra note 191, at 9.
274. D. DOBBS, supra note 188, at 205. See Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46
(Alaska 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981) (reckless indifference toward the safety of
others, malice, or wantonness required to support liability for punitive damages); Hazelwood
v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 114 Ill. App. 3d 703, 710, 450 N.E.2d 1199, 1205 (1983) (willful
and wanton conduct required); Hicks v. McCandlish, 221 S.C. 410, 415, 70 S.E.2d 629, 631
(1952) (wantonness, willfulness or recklessness required to support punitive damages); Kink v.
Combs, 28 Wis. 2d at 79, 135 N.W.2d at 797 (punitive damages "require" a showing of wan-
ton, willful or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights).
275. See supra note 268; D. DOBBS, supra note 188, at 205.
276. W. PROSSER, supra note 191, at 31. By contrast "[a]nimus malus or evil motive, then,
is the central element of the malice which justifies an exemplary award." G.D. Searle & Co. v.
Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 30, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 223 (1975). See also Young
Mercantile Trust Co. v. National Ass'n, 522 S.W.2d 274 (Mo. App. 1974) (necessity of show-
ing evil intent to support punitive damages); Cordova v. Chonko, 315 F. Supp. 953, 964 (N.D.
Ohio 1970) (mistake will not support punitive damages liability as no evil intent involved).
Some courts may hold that evil intent is not the sole predicate of liability. Rather, acts
done with bad motives or reckless indifference to the rights of others may sometimes establish
punitive damages liability. See Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288, 289 (Alaska 1983).
Nevertheless, wir6ngful intent must be present, whereas the typical intentional .eyuires no
particular evil state of mind. See Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal.'App. 3 740, 748-
49, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 241-42 (1980) (bad state of mind required to support punitive damages
liability).
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fendant's mental state thus constitutes the first line of defense to liability
for punitive damages.277 While the punitive damages defendant may
contest the amount of judgment,27 this consideration is secondary to
culpability.279 Additionally, unlike the intentional tort, culpability does
not determine liability for any damages proximately caused by the act,
but instead pinpoints the degree of reprehensibility for which punishment
will be affixed.2"'
The foregoing liability determination parallels criminal law. There,
a criminal defendant's subjective awareness of the risk of death or serious
bodily injury that may result from his act generally subjects him to more
serious charges.21 Likewise, the punitive damages defendant faces
higher degrees of liability depending on the outrageousness of his behav-
ior. One major gauge is the defendant's awareness of his actions.282 For
example, the act of driving while intoxicated with a conscious apprecia-
tion of the risk involved shows wanton conduct.28 3 When the defendant
acts with such a conscious disregard for life, malice is implied284 and the
conduct becomes sufficiently aggravated to impose punitive damages lia-
bility.2 5 Meanwhile, negligent or reckless traffic law disobedience may
exhibit similar willful or wanton behavior, but will not merit punitive
277. For example, if the defendant shows that the wrong resulted from mistake, liability is
limited to compensation for actual injury. See Cordova v. Chonko, 315 F. Supp. 953, 964
(N.D. Ohio 1970); Ebaugh v. Rabkin, 22 Cal. App. 3d 891, 895, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706, 709 (1972).
278. See supra note 123. New York courts, representing the majority view, will not reverse
awards for being disproportionate to actual damages. See Kent v. City of Buffalo, 61 Misc. 2d
142, 304 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1969).
279. This focus accounts for the growing trend of courts and legislatures to bifurcate issues
of liability from punishment assessments. See Rupert v. Sellers, 48 A.D.2d 265, 272, 368
N.Y.S.2d 904, 912 (1975) ("Defendant's wealth should not be a weapon to be used by plaintiff
to enable him to induce the jury to find the defendant guilty of malice. . . ."); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West Supp. 1984) (court determines the amount of punitive damages
in products liability actions, in an amount no more than twice the actual damages, after a jury
verdict of liability); MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILrr AT § 12(c) (1983) (trial judge
shall determine the amount of punitive damages after liability is established).
280. "[P]unitive damages may be awarded because of, and measured by [the defendant's]
wrongful purpose or intent ... ." R.STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908 comment b
(1979). Punitive damages claims are decided on a case-by-case basis to ensure that punishment
is not unduly inflicted. Fahrenberg v. Tengal, 96 Wis. 2d 211, 233-36, 291 N.W.2d 516, 526
(1980).
281. See the discussion of implied malice in criminal law in Grass, Drunk-Driving Murder
and People v. Watson: Can Malice Be Implied?, 14 S.w. L.J. 401, 435 (1984).
282. See, eg., Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 896-97, 598 P.2d 854, 857, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 693, 697 (1979) (drinking to the point of intoxication with the knowledge that one will
later drive exhibits a conscious.disreggd.for life and supports liability for punitive damages)..
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 225
(1975) (malice or willful and wanton conduct is evidenced by a conscious and deliberate disre-
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damages punishment.286 Just as criminal law is hesitant to inflict serious
sanctions on those who transgress only objective standards of reasonable-
ness but quick to punish those who actually appreciate the consequences
of their acts, 28 7 a punitive damages defendant does not face the ultimate
sanction of "civil" punishment for simple negligent conduct.
In sum, punitive damages, like the civil penalties in Helwig and the
Child Labor Tax Case, penalize proscribed activities when combined
with unacceptable mental states. Unlike civil penalty statutes in general,
they do not focus on the amount of damages for which the defendant is
liable. Nor do they reflect the amount of damages that the defendant
proximately caused, as intentional damages do. The inquiry concerns
what level of reprehensibility the defendant achieves by his behavior. As
with a criminal defendant, this question controls when and to what de-
gree the defendant will be punished. The punitive damages defendant
thus is punished for his act combined with a mental state similar to that
required for criminal culpability.288 Requiring unity of act and intent to
justify the infliction of punitive sanctions replicates criminal theory.28 9
Like the propositions from the cases cited in Kennedy, punitive damages
are not an exercise of some legitimate governmental regulatory power
with an incidental punishment effect. Instead, the sanction is imposed
for punishment purposes only, giving the punitive damages doctrine a
positive finding on the scienter question. The third Kennedy test thus
dictates a penal finding on the punitive damages issue.
D. Retribution and Deterrence
The fourth Kennedy test is whether the "operation [of the statute]
will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deter-
rence." 290  Punitive damages appear penal for all intents under this
fourth inquiry. Indeed, noting the criminal retributive function, one
gard of others' rights). See Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d at 894-95, 598 P.2d at 859,
157 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
286. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 899-900, 598 P.2d at 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
287. Generally, unless provided by statute, conviction for negligent conduct must rest on
conduct that is so negligent as to be equivalent to a criminal intent. State v. Ankeny, 185 Or.
549, 563, 204 P.2d 133, 140 (1949). However, when the defendant is under a special duty
regarding another's safety, even the mere negligent omission to perform that duty may subject
him to criminal prosecution. See State v. Williams, 4 Wash. App. 908, 915, 484 P.2d 1167,
1172 (1971) (statutory manslaughter conviction sustained where defendant's child died as a
result of lack of medical care that an ordinarily prudent person would have obtained).
288. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment b (1979).
289. Criminal law also requires a unity of act and intent-i.e., that the requisite mental
state accompany the commission of the forbidden act. People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 801,
299 P.2d 850, 852-53 (1956). See also 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 4 (1982).
290. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168.
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commentator observed that "in the framing of a model code of damages
today for use in a country unhampered by legal tradition, the doctrine of
exemplary damages would find no place."2 91
The majority of courts and commentators refuse to acknowledge pu-
nitive damages' actual nature, contending that punitive damages, though
penal, belong in the civil arena. Perhaps they accept this contradiction
only "because it has lived with them for so long."2 92 Therefore, a review
of the cases cited in Kennedy293 is imperative to determine when the
traditional aims of punishment dictate a penal label.
In United States v. Constantine,294 the first opinion cited, the Court
considered a special federal excise tax levied on alcohol dealers and man-
ufacturers who violated state laws. The tax amounted to as much as
forty times the normal liquor tax.295 Because the special excise tax was
not levied until the taxpayer violated the law, the Court concluded that
the tax-grossly disproportionate to the regular tax and coupled with
requisite illegal conduct-indicated one purpose only: "to impose a pen-
alty as a deterrent and punishment of unlawful conduct."2 96 The effect
of the sanction was to "remove all semblance of a revenue act, and stamp
the sum it exacts as a penalty."
297
Kennedy next cited Trop v. Dulles,298 a case involving expatriation
for wartime desertion. The plaintiff in Trop was denied a passport be-
cause pursuant to a statute, he had lost his nationality after a court-mar-
tial conviction for wartime desertion. An indignant Court, finding no
other legitimate purpose for revoking his citizenship except punish-
ment,2 9 9 declared the statute "penal."" ° Since the loss of citizenship was
held to be penal, the statute violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment because the method of punishment ex-
ceeded the limits of "civilized standards" for the crime charged."0 1 Con-
stantine and Trop stand for the following proposition: "If the statute
291. Note, Punitive Damages, 46 VA. L. REv. 1036, 1042 (1960) (quoting R. MCCORMICK,
DAMAGES § 77, at 276-77 (1935)).
292. Comment, supra note 3, at 409.
293. 372 U.S. at 168 n.25. The cases cited to support the fourth Kennedy test are: United
States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935), and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
294. 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
295. Id. at 295.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
299. Id. at 97.
300. Id. at 96-97.
301. The concept of cruel and unusual punishment involves more than physical punish-
ment. As the Court noted, "[tihe [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 101.
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imposes a disability for purposes of punishment-that is, to reprimand
the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc.,-it [will be] considered penal."30 2
To classify a sanction as penal, courts interpreting this Kennedy fac-
tor have held that the penalty assessed must be aimed at acts of the
wrongdoer rather than at the results.303 But the courts have miscon-
strued Kennedy by assuming that this factor is not necessarily triggered
by a purpose of punishment and deterrence.3" Examining deterrence,
courts note that while it may promote the traditional aims of criminal
law, it does not ipso facto transform a civil penalty into a penal pen-
alty.30 5 In fact, deterrence by itself could never justify finding a statute
penal because any civil penalty or remedy has some deterrent value.30 6
Ironically, while the federal courts agree that deterrence exists in any
civil penalty statute,30 7 at least one court balances deterrence against the
punitive end of a statute. Construing the Occupational Safety and
Health Act,30 8 the Atlas Roofing Court agreed that a punitive civil statute
could escape a penal label by declaring that a remedial purpose "means
not only compensatory but. . . prospective deterrence. . . to encourage
compliance with a given government regulation."3 "9 How "prospective
deterrence" transforms deterrence into a remedial function defies expla-
nation. 310 Deterrence is nothing more than prevention of an act that
might otherwise occur. In this sense, "deterrence" and "prospective de-
terrence" are identical.
Generally, however, courts avoid finding retribution and deterrence
under the fourth Kennedy test by utilizing the "act over effects test.
311
For example, if a pollution statute exacts a fine for discharging oil into a
waterway instead of penalizing the actual act of the polluter,312 the de-
clared effect of the statutory penalty is that it attempts to minimize pollu-
tion damage rather than penalize the wrongdoer. If the conduct itself is
not penalized, no retribution is exacted313 and the statute will be regula-
302. Id. at 96.
303. See Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352, 1356 (W.D. Okla. 1976), rev'd, 448 U.S. 242
(1980); United States v. General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1151, 1162 (D. Conn. 1975).
304. See infra text accompanying notes 307-10.
305. Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. at 1356.
306. United States v. General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1151, 1162 (1975).
307. Id.
308. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1975 & Supp. 1984).
309. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 518 F.2d 990,
1002 (5th Cir. 1975), afl'd, 420 U.S. 442 (1977).
310. Deterrence is effectuated by the rational weighing of costs and benefits the deteree is
likely to incur from his contemplated action. Wheeler, supra note 3, at 306.
311. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
312. Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. at 1356.
313. Id.
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tory rather than criminal. That deterrence may be achieved as well is
irrelevant since any regulatory scheme has some deterrent value.314
The deterrent purpose of punitive damages is not incidental to any
regulatory purpose. In fact, the defendant's culpability may often re-
ceive little juror attention or consideration315 where a plaintiff develops
the case by relying heavily on evidence of the defendant's wealth.
Although such evidence may prejudice the jury, the jury does not have
to account for its determinations. 1 6 Consequently, the entire process of
"jury discretion" has become a farce in recent years, with scores of gar-
gantuan verdicts being remitted on the basis of passion and prejudice. In
the infamous Grimshaw case,317 the original verdict was $125 million,
while a recent verdict in Los Angeles against Allstate Insurance Com-
pany was $40 million. 3 8 The resulting paradox is that wealthier defend-
ants will be deterred by the threat of a punitive damages verdict; yet their
behavior may be a product born not of fear of punishment for evil acts,
but for the circumstance of their financial condition. Meanwhile, impov-
erished defendants may act with impunity. They cannot be prejudiced by
their wealth, nor will the threat of "civil" punishment constitute a mean-
ingful deterrent.
The Court explicitly recognized the wealth problem when it refused
to hold municipalities liable for punitive damages in City of Newport v.
Facts Concerts, Inc. 3 9 The Court noted the obvious prejudice where the
punitive damages award against the defendant city was twice the total
amount assessed against seven city officials accused of civil rights viola-
tions. Recognizing the risk of unpredictable awards, the Court deter-
314. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp. at 1162. ("by itself the func-
tion of deterrence does not indicate a criminal sanction"). See supra text accompanying note
306.
315. See Comment, supra note 173, at 1154 (since evidence of defendant's net worth is
relevant only on the issue of actual punishment, it can be highly prejudicial in determining
liability for actual damages). In recognizing this problem, one New York appellate court de-
clared: "Defendant's wealth should not be a weapon to be used by plaintiff to enable him to
induce the jury to find the defendant guilty of malice, thus entitling plaintiff to punitive dam-
ages." Rupert v. Sellers, 48 A.D.2d 265, 272, 368 N.Y.S.2d 904, 912 (1975).
316. Juries "remain free" to utilize selective punishment. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. at 350. Additionally, "the only limit placed on the jury in awarding punitive damages is
that the damages not be 'excessive,' and in some jurisdictions, that they bear some relationship
to the amount of compensatory damages awarded." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29,
83 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
317. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (ver-
dict reduced to $3.5 million).
318. The verdict stemmed from a $31,000 bad faith claim. The trial judge held the verdict
"grossly excessive" and ordered a new trial on that issue. Fellows v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 25-
993 (L.A. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 1983).
319. 453 U.S. 247, 270-71 (1981).
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mined that assessing punitive damages against municipalities was
unjustified and refused to permit punitive damages awards against gov-
ernmental entities.320 The Supreme Court's observation should extend to
any trial where wealth is a factor. One commentator echoed this point
by noting that a defendant only marginally culpable may be liable for
punitive damages assessed in a manner wholly irrelevant to the reprehen-
sibility of his act.32'
Regardless of an exaggerated deterrent effect, however, a statute's
regulatory purpose still may outweigh its punitive and deterrent effects
and thus avoid a penal label.322 This result is particularly true when the
statute regulates an activity affecting the public.3 23 Thus, injunctions
preventing false and misleading advertising324 or penalties for public
water tampering325 may be found regulatory even though they deter sim-
ilar activity. The same holds true when a driver's license is forfeited for
writing bad checks to the state vehicle department.3 26 Also, the assess-
ment of punitive damages in products liability or insurance bad faith ac-
tions could be construed as encouraging responsible management in
areas of great public concern. Thus, although punitive damages inflict
punishment for the sake of deterrence, arguably they provide a promi-
nent regulatory effect.
It is imperative, then, to understand the function of deterrence in
punitive damages. Rather than having a distinct regulatory effect or pur-
pose, punitive damages impose a deterrence that exceeds any proffered or
imagined utilitarian regulatory goal. In fact, a majority of jurisdictions
claim deterrence by punishment as an objective.327 Deterrence consti-
tutes a basic justification for punitive damages sanctions, unlike various
civil penalty statutes.328 Not only is the overt purpose of punitive dam-
ages to exact retribution, the function of punitive damages may impede
the exercise of constitutional liberties, thereby creating a deterrence more
powerful than that produced by criminal law.3 29 For example, the.
320. Id.
321. Comment, supra note 173, at 1154.
322. See United States v. J.B. .Williams Co., 354 F. Supp. 521, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
323. Nickelson v. People, 607 P.2d 904, 910 (Wyo. 1980).
324. E.g., JB. Williams, 354 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
325. E.g., Nickelson, 607 P.2d 904 (Wyo. 1980).
326. Bauer v. Mallory, 135 Vt. 175, 177, 376 A.2d 17, 18 (1977).
327. Wheeler, supra note 3, at 306.
328. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment b (1979).
329. In addition to deterring undesirable social conduct, punitive damages may inhibit the
free exercise of inalienable constitutional rights such as free speech. Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 84 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Constitutional law forbids criminal
punishment for the content of free speech, but not all speech is protected. Speech that consti-
tutes "'advocacy . . .directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and ...
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Supreme Court has expressed considerable concern about the effect of
punitive damages on First Amendment protections. 330  Since society's
only legitimate interest in deterrence is to "discourage undesirable con-
duct,, 33 1 the Supreme Court has developed specific tests of malice that
must be satisfied before punitive damages for defamation can be im-
posed. 332 Some Justices fear that punitive damages may cause "self-cen-
sorship" where the punishment inflicted is greater than that needed to
deter the underlying misconduct. 333 Moreover, the jury is not given any
meaningful guidance to determine proper deterrence in the punitive dam-
ages process. 334 The import of the jury's discretion is that a method of
restraint, unparalleled even in the common law, is achieved. There is no
way to determine what a jury actually considers when assessing punitive
damages liability. Deterrence is thus arguably double-edged: first, there
is the possibility of an uncontrolled jury, and second, there is a possible
punitive damages assessment. Nowhere else in the law is the jury al-
lowed such unbridled discretion.
That punitive damages may serve a criminal-like deterrence found
nowhere else but in penal law is supported by its treatment in various
courts. The general approach to insurability against punitive damages
illustrates the overriding nature of deterrence in the punitive damages
doctrine.335 In light of the doctrine's punitive purpose, California, for
likely to incite or produce such action.'" may be punished. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108
(1973) (per curiam) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). Similarly, ob-
scene speech may be forbidden and punished. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). While
other speech may not be subject to content regulation or criminal punishment, the civil law
knows no bounds. Punitive damages may be assessed to punish any defamatory speech relat-
ing to the plaintiff where malice is proven. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349
(1974). See also Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206
(1983), appeal denied, 104 S. Ct. 1260 (1984) (defamation action by a public figure resulting in
punitive damages judgment). The Court has never expressly sanctioned punitive damages in
cases of defamation against public figures or officials. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
supra note 17, at 951.
330. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) ("jury discretion to award
punitive damages unecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship").
331. Wheeler, supra note 3, at 306 (citing Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 928,
582 P.2d 980, 990, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 399 (1978)).
332. Punitive damages for defamation must be supported by a showing that the defamation
involved knowing or reckless falsity. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 349.
333. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 83 (Mar-
shall, J., disssenting).
334. Id. at 83 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The manner in which unlimited discretion may
be exercised is plainly unpredictable.").
335. American jurisdictions appear to be evenly divided on whether liability for punitive
damages may be "shifted" to an insurer. A lengthy discussion of the issue is contained in
Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962). See also the col-
lection of cases and commentators at 20 A.L.R. 343-52 (3d ed. 1968 & Supp. 1984); Harrell v.
284 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 12:241
example, has adopted the view that if a tortfeasor could shift the burden
of punitive damages, such an award would serve no useful function.
336
The rationale is that no deterrence would be effectuated since the punish-
ment would ultimately fall on the consumer.337 The award would de-
pend on the amount of insurance rather than on the magnitude and
flagrancy of the offense,33' and thus would not further the goal of puni-
tive damages. Clearly, no intent is manifested merely to regulate the ac-
tivity subject to punitive damages liability. Rather, the desire is to inhibit
the defendant's tortious conduct. Another state court has noted that
such damages are "personal" and are justifiable only if the one who pays
is the wrongdoer.339 Other courts have rejected this "shifting of the bur-
den" as well.34°
Closely related to the insurance reasoning is the fact that punitive
damages may not be assessed against a nontortfeasor. 34 1 This penal as-
pect becomes apparent in those opinions prohibiting punitive damages
against government entities.342 In White v. State,3 43 for example, the
Montana government appealed a holding that the state statute immuniz-
ing government from punitive damages was unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiff alleged
that as a result of the state's reckless conduct, a violent and dangerous
mental hospital patient escaped, later attacking her and causing serious
emotional injury. Holding the Montana law valid, the Montana Supreme
Court stated that punitive damages assessed for the alleged reckless acts
of the government would have an extremely remote deterrent effect on
the tortfeasor because the taxpayers ultimately would be the ones pun-
Travelers Indemn. Co., 279 Or. 199, 226-27, 567 P.2d 1013, 1026-27 (1977) (Holman, J.,
dissenting).
336. City Prod. Corp. v. Globe Indemn. Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 41, 151 Cal. Rptr. 494,
500 (1979) (the court noted that those jurisdictions extending punitive damages to gross negli-
gence, recklessness, or wanton conduct are generally the states allowing insurability of punitive
damages).
337. Id. at 39-40, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 499. The Fifth Circuit noted the same interesting
paradox if it were to allow insurance protection against punitive damages judgments. The
"burden" would ultimately come to rest on the public, not on the insurance companies, since
insurance companies would pass along the added cost of liability to the premium-payers.
Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 440. The result would have the
anomalous effect of society punishing itself for a wrong committed against it.
338. City Prods. Corp., 88 Cal. App. 3d at 42, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 500-01.
339. Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
340. See, eg., Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962),
and the reasoning of Justice Holman's dissent in Harrell v. Travelers Indemn. Co., 279 Or. at
219-31, 567 P.2d at 1022-28 (Holman, J., dissenting).
341. See supra text accompanying notes 201-03.
342. See City of Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
343. 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983).
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ished.344 Thus, exempting a governmental entity from punitive damages
was constitutional because such damages would have punished the pub-
lic, deterred no one, and ignored the doctrine's basic justification.345
The deterrent and retributive purpose of punitive damages was more
extensively addressed by the Supreme Court in City of Newport v. Facts
Concerts, Inc. 346 In Newport, the Court considered whether punitive
damages could be assessed against a municipality for civil rights viola-
tions under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.347 Holding that Con-
gress did not intend to permit punitive damages awards under the
statute, the Court considered whether public policy dictated a "contrary
result." The Court concluded that "exposing municipalities to punitive
damages" advanced no legitimate retributive purpose.3 48 The Court also
noted that the deterrent aspect of punitive damages would be speculative
at best. 349 The Court stated that the deterrence function of punitive dam-
ages is best served by assessing such awards against the individual
tortfeasor's personal resources.35°
It is important to note that, as with all of the Court's dissertations
on punitive damages, the Court in Newport had no illusion that punitive
damages exhibit even the slightest remedial or regulatory purpose.35'
This nonregulatory purpose of punitive damages is exemplified further by
the growing trend of courts and legislatures to curb application of puni-
tive damages and to treat them on a plane removed from tort law. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court requires that culpability for punitive damages
be proved by a "clear and convincing standard. ' 352 The court held that
verdicts finding liability for punitive damages carry a "stigma" much like
civil actions involving criminal acts. 3  Thus, a higher standard of proof
344. Id at 1276. See also Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 82 A.D.2d 350, 363-64, 441
N.Y.S.2d 275, 283 (1981) (punitive damages assessed against a municipality would create the
anomalous situation of punishing the taxpayers who should benefit from such punishment).
345. White v. State, 661 P.2d at 1276.
346. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
347. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
348. 453 U.S. at 268.
349. For example, indemnification for punitive damages judgments under local law might
not be available, thereby offering no deterrence value to the policymaker and making the im-
pact on the actual tortfeasor uncertain at best. Id. at 268-69.
350. Id. at 269-70.
351. Consider id. at 266-67, where the court said that punitive damages are not intended to
compensate the plaintiff. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 350 (punitive
damages are "private fines" designed to "punish reprehensible conduct.").
352. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 300-01,294 N.W.2d 437, 458 (1980).
353. Id. at 300, 294 N.W.2d at 458.
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was mandated.354 Other jurisdictions also have reacted, instituting vari-
ous evidentiary reforms. Colorado requires that punitive damages be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt,355 while Minnesota, Oregon, and In-
diana require proof by clear and convincing evidence.356 Additionally,
the proposed Uniform Federal Products Liability Act would also require
a clear and convincing evidence standard. 57 Still other states have en-
acted legislation or have bills pending that limit the extent of punishment
assessable by either the trial judge or the jury. 8 And the Indiana Legis-
lature is considering a bill that would limit the percentage of a punitive
damages judgment awarded to the plaintiff,359 allocating the greater por-
tion of any award to the state. This scheme follows the logic that since
punitive damages are punishments that exact deterrence, such awards
should not go to plaintiffs.
In line with this trend, some states require bifurcated trials in which
a criminal proceeding, the issue of liability must be determined sepa-
rately from the issue of punishment. One New York court ordered bifur-
cation in all cases on the issues of liability and damages,3 " demanding
that evidence of wealth be withheld until liability is determined by a jury.
To prevent unjust punishment, the court held that "wealth should not be
a weapon to be used by plaintiff to enable him to induce the jury to find
the defendant guilty of malice . ,361 And under increasing support
by legal scholars,362 California, 363 Kansas,3 4 and the United States Con-
354. Id. Similarly, criminal procedure requires higher procedural protections because of
the "stigma" associated with criminal fines or imprisonment. If the nature of the forbidden
conduct carries a general moral opprobrium, a jury trial is probably constitutionally required.
"[W]hether the offense is morally offensive and malum in se or merely malum prohibitum is
one factor often employed in determining whether an offense is petty." United States v. Arbo,
691 F.2d 862, 864 (9th Cir. 1982).
355. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (1984).
356. MINN. STAT. § 30.925 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 52-49.20 (1981). This middle stan-
dard also is required by judicial rule in Indiana. See Travelers Indemn. Co. v. Armstrong, 422
N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 1982).
357. S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 13(a)(1) (1983).
358. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West Supp. 1982) (punitive damages in
products liability action limited to twice the compensatory damages); S. 1513, 1984 Sess.,
§ l(d) (Cal.) (judge determines amount of punishment after liability found by jury).
359. S. 17, 1984 Sess. (Ind.). That bill would provide that 75% of all punitive damages
judgments, less litigation expenses, be paid into the state general revenue fund.
360. Rupert v. Sellers, 48 A.D.2d 265, 368 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1975) (evidence of wealth not
admissible until liability is determined). The case is critiqued thoroughly in Note, The Use of
Evidence of Wealth in Assessing Punitive Damages in New York Rupert v. Sellers, 44 ALB. L.
REv. 422 (1980).
361. 48 A.D.2d at 272, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
362. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 53, at 664 & n.153 (listing a number of commenta-
tors in accord). Mallor and Roberts argue that the judge should assess punitive damages since
Winter 1985] PENAL DIMENSIONS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 287
gres 365 have similar bills pending that would make the trial judge re-
sponsible for assessing punitive damages once liability is established.
Some courts have refused to sanction multiple punitive damages
awards for the same tort.366 One commentator theorized that the basis
for such opinions is the spirit of the Double Jeopardy Clause. While
"courts do not always make express reference to the [Fifth Amendment]
it is clear from the decisions that they have its mandate in mind. ' 367 One
federal district court has noted that multiple punitive damages awards
must be unconstitutional since repeated punishment violates due pro-
cess.3 68 Perhaps this trend reflects the observation of the Indiana
Supreme Court that "it is better to exonerate a wrongdoer from punitive
damages" than to punish an innocent person, because society can tolerate
an error where such a serious sanction is involved.369 In any event, most
courts agree that punitive damages deter and punish, 7 ° that they have
no collateral goal or effect,3 71 that the retribution exacted carries a crimi-
nal-type stigma,372 and that they do further interests that parallel aims of
the criminal law.373 Given their overwhelming punitive character, it is
difficult to argue that punitive damages do not fulfill the fourth Kennedy
criterion of promoting the traditional aims of punishment-retribution
and deterrence.
Finally, it should be recognized that punitive damages often are as-
sessed on the equivalent of an ex post facto judgment. For example, in
the question of punishment calls for expertise. Delicate issues of economics and so-
cial policy are involved in deciding the amount of punishment-issues with which
the ordinary juror is likely to have little familiarity. Beyond being more aware of the
public policy implications of the award of punitive damages, judges have more expe-
rience in meting our punishment.
Id. at 664 (footnotes omitted).
363. S.B. 1513, Reg. Sess. 1983-84 Cal.
364. A.B. 2457, 71st Leg., Reg. Sess. 1985 Kan. (bill adopted from a model statute drafted
by this author).
365. S. 44, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., § 13(c) (1983).
366. See Comment, supra note 3, at 414.
367. Id. at 414 n.28. California, to some limited extent, prevents double recovery for
wrongful death punitive damages claims. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294(d) (West Supp. 1984)
(multiple punitive damages may not be recovered in wrongful death actions arising from a
felony-homicide for which the defendant was convicted).
368. In re "Dalkon Shield," 526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847
(9th Cir. 1982), cert denied sub nom. A.H. Robins Co. v. Abed, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
369. Travelers Indemn. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 362 (Ind. 1982).
370. See W. PROSSER, supra note 191, at 9 n.62 for a list of authorities.
371. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 350. See also the discussion on'alternative
justifications to the punitive damages doctrine, infra part IIF.
372. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d at 300, 294 N.W.2d at 457. See also
Wheeler, supra note 3, at 282 (punitive damages equal a "badge of disgrace").
373. See supra note 272.
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determining actual damages, the jury may use "hindsight" to determine
liability of a defendant product manufacturer.374 The jury may find a
defect in the design of a product if it finds that at the time of the prod-
uct's conception "the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design
outweigh[ed] the benefits of such design." '375 Such a determination may
establish outrageous behavior on the part of the defendant. Since today's
social and ethical values may guide a jury's consideration of yesterday's
mistakes, 376 corporations ultimately may be punished for business judg-
ments that were ethical at the time they were made.3 77 If anything effec-
tively promotes retribution and deterrence it is hindsight, the very
antithesis of American jurisprudence.3 78 A judgment founded on hind-
sight will discourage a former course of conduct and should be declared
unconstitutional in areas, such as free speech, that may be affected by
self-censorship.379
Punitive damages are intended only to punish and deter. Unlike
nonpenal civil penalties, punitive damages target conduct, not the result-
ing harm. Finally, and most importantly, unlike anything else in tort
law, punitive damages are not assessed for injuries but are geared to the
reprehensibility of the actor's behavior. No purer method of retribution
and deterrence exists, with the exception of criminal law.
E. Is the Punished Conduct Already a Crime?
Much of the conduct punished by punitive damages could be pun-
374. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
236 (1978). For example, a jury using hindsight may find a product defective in design if such
design contained an excessive, preventable danger. Id. at 434, 573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal. Rptr.
at 239. It is only a small leap in logic to determine that such conduct may also arise to a
"conscious disregard" of the rights of others-although it is not clear that such an award has
been sustained without a showing of an intentional course of conduct with an actual knowl-
edge of a product's defect. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 808, 174
Cal Rptr. 348, 381 (1980); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 267, 294 N.W.2d 437,
442 (1980). Indeed, coupled with knowledge, a conscious disregard for the safety of others
creates the liability for punitive damages. Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387, 396-97 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981).
375. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
376. Professor Owen cautions that care should be taken to avoid punishing the defendant
for conduct or actions that may have been justified at the time performed, although the justifi-
cation is not apparent at the time the jury hears the case. Owen, Problems in Assessing Puni-
tive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 5 J. PROD. LIAB. 341, 353-54
(1982).
377. Id.
378. Thus, ex post facto laws and bills of attainder designed to assess punishment for prior
conduct are forbidden by the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
379. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 82-83 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ished as crime.3" In fact, it has been acknowledged that punitive dam-
ages compensate for the shortcomings of the criminal system in
prosecuting such conduct.381
The fifth Kennedy test is "whether the behavior to which [the sanc-
tion] applies is already a crime. '  A positive finding on this test would
not only require criminal procedural safeguards, but also would end a
growing controversy surrounding mass tort claims for punitive damages
and polarized rulings on due process.383
One district court has held that multiple awards do not violate due
process, 384 whereas the Northern District of California has ruled to the
contrary.385 Labeling the proscribed behavior as criminal would elimi-
nate these discrepancies since the Fifth Amendment would prohibit
double punishment. However, because it is preferable to develop univer-
sal legal principles relating to punitive damages, it is not desirable to
require an abstract inquiry into each punitive damages claim to deter-
mine whether the conduct would be a crime under a particular jurisdic-
tion's statutes. Additionally, since a foreign jurisdiction may punish a
punitive damages defendant for his conduct,386 anomalous situations can
result in which a defendant is punished for a wrong that was not classi-
380. Assault often supports punitive damage awards. See the collection of cases at Annot.,
98 A.L.R. 3D 872-85 (1980 & Supp. 1984).
381. Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 80, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (1965).
382. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168.
383. See Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 376-77 (E.D. Pa. 1982); In re
"Dalkon Shield," 526 F. Supp. 887, 898-900 (N.D. Cal. 1981); State ex rel. Young v. Crook-
ham, 290 Or. 61, 65-70, 618 P.2d 1268, 1273-74 (1980). In the second case, the court reviewed
the purpose of punitive damages and concluded that since their purpose was punitive, multiple
punishment of the defendant would violate both the prohibition against double jeopardy and
due process because "overlapping damage awards violate that sense of 'fundamental fairness'
which lies at the heart of constitutional due process." In re "'Dalkon Shield," 526 F. Supp. at
898-900.
384. In Neal, the court adopted the position that a product manufacturer owes a separate
duty to each consumer and injury caused by the product to any one consumer is individual to
that person. Independently punishable acts arise each time a product user is injured despite
the existence of a universal defect. Thus, for example, all persons poisoned by asbestos fiber
can maintain a claim for punitive damages, unaffected by other claims. 548 F. Supp. at 377-78.
385. "[Clommon sense dictates that a defendant should not be subjected to multiple civil
punishment for a single act or unified course of conduct which causes injury to multiple plain-
tiffs." In re "Dalkon Shield," 526 F. Supp. at 900. A class action, held the district court, is the
preferable way to proceed when a mass tort is involved so that the defendant is punished only
once for his wrong. Id.
386. The constitutional requirements for .sserting "long arm jurisdiction" over out-of-state
defendants are well-settled:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
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fled as a crime in the state where it was committed." 7 Therefore, it be-
comes necessary to determine whether conduct punishable as a crime
requires due process protection, and whether all conduct punished by
punitive damages can be considered criminal.
Kennedy referred to three cases that support the "crime" analysis.388
In Lipke v. Lederer,3" 9 the petitioner appealed from a denial of injunction
to prevent the federal government from collecting'a "double tax" for his
illegal sale of liquor. He asserted that in reality the tax punished activity,
and as such criminal procedure must guide collection of the "tax.2
390
The Court held that a double tax for illegal behavior lacked the "ordi-
nary characteristics of a tax" since it "clearly involve[d] the idea of pun-
ishment" instead of revenue collection.391 The Court emphasized that a
tax "primarily designed to define and suppress crime" was unconstitu-
tional since criminal penalties must be assessed in accordance with due
process guarantees.
392
The second cited authority, United States v. LaFranca,393 involved
the same "tax" assessment for the unlawful sale of alcohol. Again, the
Court held the tax constituted a penalty, exacting nothing more than
punishment "for illegal acts."' 394 LaFranca added the admonishment
that courts should not defer to legislative labeling of a "penalty involving
the idea of punishment for infraction of the law."' 395 Since the petitioner
already had been fined and imprisoned for the same acts, he could not be
repunished by "double taxation.
396
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1941)). Thus a defendant can be ordered punished by punitive damages
while not present in the state, and another jurisdiction, unconcerned with the subject matter of
the lawsuit, can effectuate the punishment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Con-
stitution. Stupar v. Bank of Westmont, 40 Ill. App. 3d 514, 352 N.E.2d 29 (1976).
387. In Brown v. Clorox Co., 56 Cal. App. 3d 306, 128 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1976), California
asserted jurisdiction over a California manufacturer in a suit arising out of injury caused by a
defective product shipped to Washington State where the harm occurred. Because Washing-
ton disallows punitive damages, the manufacturer would have been liable in that state only for
the actual damage caused. By successfully asserting jurisdiction in California, however, the
plaintiff was given the opportunity to punish the defendant, regardless of Washington public
policy. Id. at 312-13, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
388. The cases are: United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); United States v.
LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922).
389. 259 U.S. 557 (1922).
390. Id. at 559.
391. Id. at 562.
392. Id.
393. 282 U.S. 568 (1931).
394. Id. at 572.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 572-76.
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The final supporting proposition that the Kennedy Court relied upon
was United States v. Constantine,97 discussed previously. The Court re-
iterating that an increase in taxes caused by a taxpayer's conduct only
serves as deterrence and punishment for illegal behavior,3 98 added one
important observation to the holdings of Lipke and LaFranca: the
"highly exorbitant" assessment of forty times the regular tax rate indi-
cated that the tax was not exacted for government revenue or for the
"importance of the business or supposed ability to pay. ' 3 99 Thus, where
the penalty is premised on a crime, it will be considered penal when ac-
companied by a fine grossly disproportionate to any legitimate regulatory
power.
There is no doubt that many punitive damages verdicts are premised
on criminal deportment.' One commentator has argued that this rela-
tionship affects only the issue of whether to mitigate or enhance punitive
damages once criminal fines have been imposed."°1 The reason offered is
that civil punishment can effectuate adequate deterrence when penal
sanctions are not sufficient." 2 However, another commentator has
pointed out that additional punishment inflicted by the "sole discretion"
of a jury "is clearly uncivilized.'1 ' °3 He proposes instead that if the de-
fendant is not deterred, injunctive relief and, ultimately, incarceration for
contempt are available.'
Legislatures are not exempt from this punishment/enhancement
confusion either. In California, for example, special legislation was
passed permitting a plaintiff to collect punitive damages in a wrongful
death action once the defendant is convicted of the felcny that caused the
death of the deceased. 4 5 A review of the bill reveals that the apparent
purpose is to advance punishment of criminals through civil suits!
4 6
397. 296 U.S. 287 (1935). See supra notes 294-97 and accompanying text.
398. Id. at 295.
399. Id.
400. Comment, supra note 3, at 413. Punitive damages commonly are assessed for injuries
caused by intoxicated drivers where the defendants have been criminally punished for their
acts. See, eg., Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 183, 508 P.2d 211 (1973). For a list of similar opin-
ions, see 65 A.L.R. 3D 666-68 (1975).
401. Comment, supra note 3, at 413-17.
402. Id.
403. K. REDDEN, supra note 11, at 627.
404. Id.
405. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(d) (West Supp. 1984) ("Damages may be recovered pursu-
ant to this section in an action. . . based upon a death which resulted from a homicide for
which the defendant has been convicted of a felony, whether or not the decedent died instantly
or survived the fatal injury for some period of time.").
406. Previously, punitive damages had not been allowed in wrongful death actions. See
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1984) and CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (West Supp.
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Courts that have addressed the criminality question have taken sev-
eral different approaches. One federal court held that under Kennedy,
filing a civil action premised on criminal prosecution "triggers" a positive
finding on the fifth Kennedy test." 7 Another court decided that when
criminal immunity for the penalized conduct is available, the criminal
effect of punitive damages is vitiated, which results in a negative finding
under the fifth Kennedy criterion." 8 Another approach is the "parallel
statutes test."4 9 Under this test, courts look for a criminal statute that
parallels the civil penalty provision. Such examination, however, leads to
uneven logic and inconsistent results since many civil penalty statutes
have no counterpart in criminal law.41° In any event, whether the act is
subject to both civil and criminal punishment is not determinative, but
only indicative of a remedial nature.411 Legislatures often impose crimi-
nal and civil sanctions for the same act.412 The real question, as posited
by the Supreme Court, is whether the allegedly civil sanction is actually
penal and thus merits appropriate safeguards.413
The core concern is simply whether the punishment is premised on
criminal behavior. Of course, this reasoning could become circular be-
cause the punishment often indicates that the behavior is considered
criminal.414 But even without parallel penal statutes, the base behavior
may be so similar to criminal behavior that the ostensibly criminal con-
duct activates the penalty, thereby satisfying the fifth Kennedy factor.
Essentially, a cause of action provided solely to compensate injury would
be found remedial.415 Conversely, where the statute provides punish-
ment for "an offense against the public justice of the state,, 416 the act is
considered penal. In short, public or criminal wrongs constitute "a
1984). However, the Act is part of the Crime Victim Restitution Program of 1983, 1983 CAL.
STAT., ch. 408, § 2, and was designed to enable "the survivors of homicide victims to obtain
punitive damages from convicted criminals." 1983 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. 2688 (West).
407. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1151, 1162 (D. Conn. 1975).
408. Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352, 1356 (W.D. Okla. 1976), rev'd, 598 F.2d 1187
(10th Cir. 1979), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
409. Charney, supra note 86, at 500.
410. Id. at 501 ("parallel statutes test" is unsatisfactory since most civil penalty provisions
"do not have companion criminal sanction provisions").
411. United States v. Eureka Pipeline Co., 401 F. Supp. 934, 940 (N.D. W. Va. 1975).
412. Id.
413. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398 (1938) (determining whether a parallel civil
statute was penal in the face of a double jeopardy challenge).
414. See supra parts IIA & B.
415. A statute is penal if it inflicts punishment for an offense against the state, but remedial
if it provides a private remedy to an injured party. Tulsa Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. McMi-
chael Concrete Co., 495 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Okla. 1972) (quoting Huntington v. Attril, 146 U.S.
657 (1892)).
416. Tulsa Ready-Mix Concrete Co., 495 P.2d at 1282.
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breach and violation of public rights and duties." '417
Although Lipke, LaFranca, and Constantine each involved a deline-
ated crime as the premise for assessing a civil penalty, a civil statute
predicated on conduct that constitutes criminal behavior should satisfy
the fifth Kennedy test. This approach is consistent with that of punish-
ment exacted only to redress the breach of a social duty.418 An individ-
ual can punish another only by stepping into the state's shoes as a
"private attorney general' 419 or as a deputy of the state,420 and only then
by prosecuting claims for wrongs committed against society.421 The es-
sence of vindicating a public wrong led one Wisconsin Supreme Court
justice to declare that the function of civil law and punitive damages is
not to address the concerns of the criminal system.422
Punitive damages will fall within the fifth Kennedy criterion when
the underlying tort involves a crime.42 3 Even where the behavior qualify-
ing for punishment has not been classified as criminal conduct, punitive
damages vindicate breaches of social duties that the defendant owes to
the public as a whole.424 This proposition is supported implicitly by vari-
417. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. As one federal court further pointed out,
"[t]he true test is whether the wrong to be... punished is primarily to an individual or to the
State." Porter v. Household Fin. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 336, 340 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (quoting
Huntington v. Attril, 146 U.S. 657, 667 (1892)).
418. Acknowledging this point, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that "[t]he protec-
tion of the public from such conduct [gross negligence] or from reckless, wanton, or wilful
conduct is best served by the criminal laws of the state." Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 18,
114 N.W.2d 105, 113 (1962).
419. As the court said in In re Paris Air Crash: "So far is this opportunity [of seeking
punitive damages] from being a fundamental personal right that it is an interest not truly
personal in nature at all. It is rather a public interest, and in defining who may give it effect the
legislature should be given a broad discretion, similar to the discretion of a prosecutor." 622
F.2d 1315, 1319-20 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Kalinsky v. General Dynamics Corp., 449
U.S. 976 (1980).
420. See infra note 454.
421. See id. and supra note 419. Blackstone pointed out that public wrongs "are a breach
and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a
community; and are distinguished by the harsher appellation of crimes and misdemesnors
[sic]." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
422. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d at 328, 294 N.W.2d at 471 (Cofly, J.,
dissenting).
423. Assault and battery are the most common crimes supporting punitive damages liabil-
ity. See supra note 380. Responding to the troublesome invasion of criminal functions into
civil law via punitive damages, Justice Coffy of the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared that
one of the major concerns is that "[t]he doctrine of punitive damages does not provide the
defendant with the benefits of the constitutional safeguards afforded in criminal proceedings."
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d at 328, 294 N.W.2d at 471 (Coffy, J., dissenting).
424. Where fraud, malice, or outrageous conduct is involved, punitive damages punish the
breach of civil duty and not the injury to the plaintiff. In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d at 1323.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 & comment b (1979).
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ous state courts' formulations of the punitive damages function. In Cali-
fornia, for instance, punitive damages function to assail socially
unacceptable behavior 425 and to vindicate public interest.426 A Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court justice concurred with this judgment, inquiring why
damages do not go "to the public in whose behalf [the defendant] is pun-
ished."4 2 7 Even more convincing is the Wisconsin court's statement that
punitive damages bring punishment to conduct that goes "unpunished by
the prosecutor.""42 Language from an Illinois court is in accord. Stating
that "punitive damages are in the nature of a criminal sanction," the
court held that "the punishment should fit the crime."429 In Florida,
punitive damages are aimed at "antisocial conduct. ' 430 The language
from these courts constitutes the ultimate irony. While refusing to recog-
nize the defendant's rights to due process protections, they nevertheless
have acknowledged that only ostensibly criminal conduct justifies puni-
tive damages.
An additional aspect of punitive damages strengthens the conclusion
that they are premised on the equivalent of criminal behavior. Before a
claim for punitive damages will lie, the plaintiff must have a recognizable
cause of action based on some other claim, since punitive damages alone
cannot constitute a cause of action.43 The plaintiff has no personal
right to punitive damages,432 while the jury possesses unfettered discre-
tion to punish for socially unacceptable behavior. If the social wrong
may be punished, the act should be considered functionally equivalent to
a criminal wrong.433 Since punitive damages arise only for misconduct
against the public, and are never awarded as a matter of right, the con-
duct upon which punitive damages are premised should be sufficiently
425. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 598 P.2d 452, 457, 157
Cal. Rptr. 482, 487 (1979) (purpose of punitive damages is to deter socially unacceptable acts).
426. In re "Dalkon Shield," 526 F. Supp. at 899 ("Punitive damages are exacted for the
benefit of society .... " ).
427. Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654, 672 (1877) (Ryan, C.J., concurring). Chief
Justice Ryan also stated that "[i]t is difficult on principle to understand why, when the sufferer
by a tort has been fully compensated for his suffering, he should recover anything more." Id.
428. Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d at 80, 135 N.W.2d at 798.
429. Hazelwood v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 114 IlM. App. 3d 703, 713, 450 N.E.2d 1199,
1207 (1983) (emphasis added).
430. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 436 (5th Cir. 1962).
431. "There is no cause of action for punitive damages." Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 148
Cal. App. 3d 374, 391, 196 Cal. Rptr. 117, 127-28 (1983). They can never be the basis for
litigation. Id. The plaintiff first must plead and prove an independent cause of action on
which he can premise a punitive damages claim. See the discussion and cases at 22 Am. Jug.
2D Damages § 241 (1965 & Supp. 1984).
432. Since the plaintiff has no inherent right to punitive damages, it is never error not to
award them. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d at 301-02, 294 N.W.2d at 458.
433. Id. at 309 n.30, 294 N.W.2d at 462 n.30.
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penal for a positive finding under the fifth Kennedy factor. This determi-
nation, however, could open up a Pandora's box of constitutional debate.
As one federal court noted, a cause of action solely for the purpose of
punishing social injustice may be brought only by the state.43 4
Some may argue that not all conduct justifying punitive damages
can be classified as criminal. For example, the government may not pun-
ish a publisher in any manner for defamation or libel; yet a private citizen
can punish the publisher, subject only to proving malice before a jury.
435
But as one commentator retorted, if the base conduct is not worthy of
penal sanctions, or if public punishment cannot be constitutionally in-
flicted, no legitimate ratiocination should justify exacting retribution by
means that circumvent the Bill of Rights.436
On the whole, however, qualifying behavior requires elements simi-
lar to criminal law. For instance, many jurisdictions punish fraud by
both criminal sanctions and punitive damages.437 A growing number of
jurisdictions allow drunk driving to be punished by both methods as
well. 438 Even more persuasive is the ubiquitous use of "malice" to prove
socially unacceptable behavior. The malice terminology could erode the
distinction between punitive damages and criminal law. For example, in
upholding a charge of second degree murder in People v. Watson,a39 the
California Supreme Court established the requisite criminal conscious
disregard for life by adopting a malice definition articulated in a drunk
driving tort case that awarded punitive damages.' 0 The court inter-
twined punitive damages and criminal law analyses to the extent that the
borrowed punitive damages doctrine to clarify criminal culpability under
434. Cf. Porter v. Household Fin. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 336, 342 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
435. See supra note 25.
436. See K. REDDEN, supra note 11, at 627 (if conduct is not formally proscribed, it should
not be a jury function to decide whether the behavior should be punished).
437. For example, any person in California who signs the name of another person to any
document of value with the intent to defraud another person is guilty of forgery. CAL. PENAL.
CODE § 470 (West 1970). The same conduct is punishable by punitive damages as an inten-
tional misrepresentation of a material fact if done with the intent to deprive someone of prop-
erty or legal rights, or cause someone injury. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1985). A
punitive damages claim is not barred merely because the same conduct is also punishable by
criminal sanctions. Wilson v. Middleton, 2 Cal. 54, 54-56 (1852).
438. The reasoning of the Oregon Supreme Court generalizes the rule allowing punitive
damages for illegally driving while under the influence of alcohol. The rationale is that sanc-
tioning such damages in injury suits will act "as a deterrent to the conduct proscribed by...
statute." Dorm v. Wilmarth, 254 Or. 236, 242-43, 458 P.2d 942, 945 (1969). See the collection
of similar cases at Annot., 65 A.L.R. 3D 666-68 (1975).
439. 30 Cal. 3d 290, 637 P.2d 279, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1981).
440. Id. at 300-01, 637 P.2d at 286, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
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the penal system." 1
In sum, both the spirit and the nature of conduct supporting puni-
tive damages are criminal. Like Lzpke, LaFranca, and Constantine, so-
cially unacceptable conduct triggers punishment. With this type of
behavior activating a punitive damages sanction, the basis for liability
constitutes a wrong that is criminal in nature.442 Thus, the fifth Kennedy
test dictates stricter procedural due process protections under the puni-
tive damages doctrine.
F. Alternative Purpose
The sixth test enunciated in Kennedy, "whether an alternative to
which [punitive damages] may be rationally connected is assignable for
[them],"" 3 relies on previously cited cases to assign meaning to the in-
quiry.' While the punishment/deterrent purpose of punitive damages
has already been discussed, a subtle rationale is often suggested to defend
the doctrine. For this reason, an examination of punitive damages under
the sixth Kennedy test is necessary.
The basic proposition from the cited cases is that if the alleged pen-
alty serves a legitimate government purpose other than punishment, the
sanction will be construed as nonpenal. This construction has been uti-
lized restrictively because courts are not in the position to assess which
remedy in a dual-function statute is "most likely to achieve the legislative
aim."" 5 If the possible alternative is reasonably related to a legitimate
statutory aim, the alternative will supplant any penal effect." 6 In Ward
v. Coleman,' 7 the Tenth Circuit held that a penalty assessed for violating
the Federal Water Pollution and Control Act had an alternative purpose:
441. See Grass, supra note 281, at 434 (discussing the adoption of delineated "civil malice"
to establish the "conscious disregard for life" necessary to sustain a homicide charge).
442. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
443. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
444. To support the sixth Kennedy test, the Court cited Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,
615, 617 (1960) (see supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
96, 97 (1958) (see supra notes 298-302 and accompanying text); United States v. LaFranca, 282
U.S. 568, 572 (1931) (see supra notes 393-96 and accompanying text); Child Labor Tax Case,
259 U.S. 20 (1921) (see supra notes 232-37 aid accompanying text); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S.
557, 561, 562 (1922) (see supra notes 389-92 and accompanying text); and Cummings v. Mis-
souri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 277, 319 (1867) (see supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text).
445. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comnm'n, 518 F.2d 990,
1010 (5th Cir. 1975), affid, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
446. Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub
non. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980). In construing a penalty provision under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, another federal court cautioned that the jury knows little
about the hazards of industry save what they see in a tragic case after the event of death or
injury. Atlas Roofing Co., 518 F.2d at 1010.
447. 598 F.2d 1187 (10th Cir. 1979).
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remedying environmental damage. The Court in Ward noted, however,
that if a fine exceeds *the amount of reasonable compensation to the gov-
ernment, it will become penal." 8 Nevertheless, even though a civil pen-
alty statute may involve some punishment, if there is an alternative
remedial purpose, such as reimbursement to the government for litiga-
tion costs, and such compensation is not unreasonable in relation to the
harm, a civil remedy will not otherwise be transformed into a criminal
penalty.
449
When interpreting civil penalty statutes, courts will not make legis-
lative evaluations.450 Even where punishment is clearly an unavoidable
by-product, "[t]he Court cannot substitute its own judgment for the in-
formed choice of the [legislature] by interpreting [the] by-product to be
the primary purpose of the statute."4'' The bottom line is that even
where a significant punitive end is effectuated, any alternative purpose
that reasonably relates to a legitimate end will save the statute as reme-
dial. While the exclusive purpose of punitive damages is punishment for
the sake of deterrence,452 the argument has been made that alternative
purposes exist.453 Presumably, such arguments could save punitive dam-
ages from a penal label and vitiate the need for higher degrees of consti-
tutional safeguards.
The first proffered alternative purpose is that punitive damages pro-
vide an incentive for private prosecution, encouraging citizens to take on
the responsibility of a "private attorney general" to vindicate public jus-
tice.454 This alternative might persuade individual parties to bring suits
where the tortfeasor has caused little damage and the injured party might
not otherwise seek compensation in the complex and slow judicial pro-
cess.455 Thus, awarding punitive damages arguably rewards a persistent
plaintiff for his efforts to right a wrong. The second alternative purpose,
which overlaps the first, asserts that punitive damages satisfy the costs
448. Id. at 1194.
449. In re Garay, 89 NJ. 104, 444 A.2d 1107 (1982). The Garay court reiterated the
general rule that as long as a penaltyfixed by statute was not too unreasonable or excessive on
its face, a civil remedy would not be transformed into a criminal penalty. Id. at 114, 444 A.2d
at 1112.
450. Atlas Roofing Co., 518 F.2d at 1010.
451. United States v. General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1151, 1163 (D. Conn. 1975).
452. See supra part IID.
453. Owen, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1257,
1287-88 (1976).
454. Id. The state, in effect, authorizes private litigants to act "as deputies to bring suits
expressing social condemnation and disapproval." In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1322
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980).
455. See generally Owen, supra note 453, at 1293 (expense of litigation may prevent a
plaintiff from asserting his legal rights).
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and attorneys' fees incurred when prosecuting a successful suit in the
public's interest.
456
Both of the foregoing alternatives are inherently inconsistent given
the theory of punitive damages and the practical utilization of "incen-
tives" or "costs" under either statute or judicial rule.457 Before analyzing
these alternative justifications, however, brief mention of those jurisdic-
tions that explicitly assign other purposes to the punitive damages doc-
trine is appropriate.
In Michigan, for example, punitive damages are available to com-
pensate for humiliation, sense of outrage, and indignity resulting from
the defendant's willful, malicious, and wanton acts.458 This remedial
purpose, however, seems to compensate the plaintiff for emotional dis-
tress and is therefore consistent with the doctrine's original purpose of
relief for incompensable injuries.459
The judicially defined role of punitive damages in Connecticut re-
sembles' that of Michigan: "[p]unitive damages are designed not to pun-
ish the defendant for his offense but rather to compensate the plaintiff for
his injuries."'  Courts in these two states do not conduct an "alterna-
tive purpose" analysis because damages are premised solely on compen-
satory, rather than punishment, objectives. Nothing in these
jurisdictions dictates higher standards of procedural protection since ret-
ribution is neither the goal nor the effect of punitive damages.46'
When examining alternative purposes for punitive damages in the
majority of states, a brief look at forfeiture proceedings proves helpful. In
general, where there is no legitimate justification other than retribution,
the courts have disallowed forfeitures absent procedural protections.
The leading case in this area is One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Penn-
sylvania.4 2 The petitioner in that case previously had been charged with
456. See Brewer v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 200 Kan. 96, 434 P.2d 828 (1967) (jury could
not be instructed to award attorneys' fees in addition to punitive damages, but could consider
attorneys' fees and costs as a function of punitive damages). See the collection of similar cases
at Annot., 30 A.L.R. 3D 1448-53 (1970 & Supp. 1983).
457. See infra notes 471-511 and accompanying text.
458. Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 419, 295 N.W.2d 50, 55
(1980) (citing McFadden v. Tate, 350 Mich. 84, 85 N.W.2d 181 (1957)).
459. See Duffey, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should Be Abolished, in THE CASE
AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 5 (Defense Institute Research Monograph 1969).
460. Miller v. Drouin, 183 Conn. 189, 191, 438 A.2d 863, 864 (1981). See also Vratsenes v.
New Hampshire Auto, Inc., 112 N.H. 71, 289 A.2d 66 (1972) (punitive damages not allowed
in New Hampshire for purposes of punishment and deterrence).
461. Connecticut recently approved limited punitive damages awards in products liability
actions, but the award decision is assigned to the trial judge. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
240b (West Supp. 1982).
462. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
Winter 1985] PENAL DIMENSIONS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 299
criminally violating Pennsylvania liquor laws. Subsequently, the State of
Pennsylvania sought possession of the defendant's automobile through
civil forfeiture proceedings. The Court held that forfeiture was dispro-
portionate to the wrong and to attendant penalties which the defendant
already faced.463 Even though forfeiture might become the state's only
recourse, greater punishment than the penalties obtained by conviction
could result.4 The main issue in the case was whether the Fourth
Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and seizures prohibited
introducing possibly unlawful evidence. The Court noted that the exclu-
sionary rule46" might apply in the alternate criminal proceeding and
thereby thwart prosecution. The Court then said that it would be
"anomalous" to disregard the rule in the civil forfeiture proceeding
where the defendant faced the loss of his $1,000 car for a crime punish-
able by no more than a $500 fine. Hence, the Court found the potential
loss of the car disproportionate to the authorized criminal sanction and
declared the forfeiture proceeding to be penal, thereby requiring the
Fourth Amendment's protection.466
Similarly, United States v. Coin & Currency4 67 involved the statu-
tory forfeiture of illegal gambling proceeds through civil proceedings. A
forfeiture was predicated entirely on violation of federal law. In fact, the
only statutory defense available provided that if the defendant could
show that the "forfeiture was incurred without willful negligence or
without any intention... to violate the law... " he could avoid the
penalty.4 68 Based on the face of the statute, the Court found no other
apparent effect except an attempt to penalize the alleged wrongdoer.
469
No alternative remedial purpose for forfeiture was evident, nor was there
any intent, purpose, or effect to secure reasonable compensation to sup-
port a nonpunitive end. These forfeiture cases indicate that the courts
will guard against improper circumvention of the criminal process. This
reasoning applies not only to forfeiture but also to any instance where
463. Id. at 702.
464. Id. at 700-01. For example, the defendant in One Plymouth Sedan was subject to a
maximum $500 fine, whereas the value he stood to lose in his car through civil forfeiture would
have been $1,000.
465. The exclusionary rule provides that evidence seized by public authorities in violation
of the Constitution cannot be introduced against the accused at trial. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
466. One Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 702-03.
467. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
468. Id. at 721.
469. Id. at 721-22. See also Clark, supra note 76, at 477 (forfeitures of property other than
contraband is punitive).
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guaranteed rights are infringed.47 °
The alternative purpose of "providing incentive" to prosecute a suit
has not been sanctioned frequently by the courts.471 Nevertheless, one
commentator has suggested that "punitive damages awards have come to
serve the function of encouraging private prosecutions."472 Since virtu-
ally every tort action now seeks punitive damages,473 the observation
hardly can be disputed. But the extent of unsuccessful litigation indi-
cates that the merits of many punitive damages claims are in serious
doubt.4 74 Consequently, this "alternative" is really no alternative at all,
but only a furtherance of the retributive goal.475 This effect is precisely
what the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted in Kinks v. Combs47 6 when it
discussed the incentive rationale. The court considered the efficacy of a
punitive damages claim based on a tort action of assault and battery.
The facts suggested an attempted rape, but arguably the evidence fell
short of that needed for a successful criminal prosecution. While a crimi-
nal action for assault and battery might have been successful, the court
pointed out that, in any event, such actions are seldom prosecuted. Using
this scenario as justification for retribution exacted through the civil pro-
cess, the court stated: "Suffice it to say that whatever shortcomings the
award of punitive damages may have, nevertheless, it must be
remembered that it has the effect of bringing to punishment types of con-
duct that though oppressive and hurtful to the individual almost invaria-
bly go unpunished by the public prosecutor. 47 7 The court stated further
that "the self interest of the plaintiff will lead to prosecution of the claim
470. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). Discussing the propriety of civil
forfeiture proceedings, the Court said "[ilt is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitu-
tional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." Id. (emphasis
added). An excellent analysis of Boyd is contained in Clark, supra note 76, at 414-20.
471. Comment, supra note 173, at 1145.
472. Id.
473. Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 761-62, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237,
249-50 (1980) (Elkington J., concurring) (The "widely expanded" circumstances under which
punitive damages can now be awarded, both as to types of actions and amounts, "have brought
about the present day practice of seeking punitive damages in substantially all damage actions,
and what will reasonably be termed the explosion of punitive damage awards.").
474. In Los Angeles, for example, a study by the Los Angeles Times has shown that despite
the rising popularity of assessing punitive damages, the damages are actually assessed in less
than 10% of tort cases. The Los Angeles verdicts for punitive damages in 1982 ranged from
$25 to $64 million. Hiltzik, Punitive Claims Challenge Limits of Law, L.A. Times, Feb. 17,
1984, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
475. This point is further manifested by those scholars who contend that punitive damages
are "outlets" or "relief valves" for private vengeance. See, eg., Mallor & Roberts, supra note
53, at 650.
476. 28 Wis. 2d 65, 135 N.W.2d 789 (1965).
477. Id. at 80, 135 N.W.2d at 798 (emphasis added).
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* . ,,*478 The "incentive" alternative, rather than evidencing a collat-
eral remedial objective like that in Ward, merely extends the criminal
punishment mechanism like the forfeiture attempts discussed above.
Thus, while punitive damages provide an incentive to prosecute suits in
society's interest, justifying them on this ground clearly acknowledges
that the doctrine furthers the punitive ends of criminal law.
A further criticism of the incentive alternative is that it treats puni-
tive damages as merely a proxy for an inadequate criminal justice system.
As such, punitive damages actions would be unconstitutional private
prosecutions, since criminal justice is the sole domain of the govern-
ment.479 The Supreme Court declared long ago that enforcing punitive
sanctions through civil procedure is forbidden.480 Additionally, if legis-
latures wanted to provide incentive to prosecute specific types of actions,
thereby compensating plaintiffs for their socially laudable efforts, it
should follow that punitive damages could constitute an independent
cause of action, yet they do not. Nor is it clear why punitive damages, if
they are considered a proper alternative incentive, are not favored in the
law.
481
It might also be argued that the purpose of punitive damages is to
encourage private suits seeking redress of slight injury as opposed to pun-
ishment of an individual. This justification is outweighed, however, by a
number of factors. For instance, small claims courts are provided for
just such purposes.4 82 In California, for example, plaintiffs may prose-
cute cases in small claims courts for actual damages up to $1,500.483 The
procedure is expeditious, inexpensive, lawyerless, and generally conclu-
sive.484 Where claims are moderate, municipal and district courts are
also available as expedient forums.485 The plaintiff does not need puni-
478. Id.
479. Punishment for crime is a state responsibility. Bergman v. State, 187 Wash. 622, 625,
60 P.2d 699, 701 (1936).
480. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402 n.6 (1937).
481. Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 750, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 242
(1980); Lewiston Pistol Club, Inc. v. Imthurn, 94 Idaho 264, 266, 486 P.2d 275, 277 (1977);
McElwain v. Georgia Pacific, 245 Or. 247, 249, 421 P.2d 957, 958 (1966).
482. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.2 (West 1982).
483. Id.
484. For example, the legislative declaration in the California Code of Civil Procedure
provides that the small claims forum is intended to provide an expeditious, inexpensive "forum
accessible to all parties." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.1 (West 1982). An adverse judgment
on the plaintiff's claim is not appealable. Id. § 116. Further, parties are precluded from ap-
pearing in a small claims action with an attorney. Id. § 117.4.
485. In California, municipal courts generally have jurisdiction of suits demanding less
than $15,000. In the simplified municipal court litigation process, discovery is extremely lim-
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tive damages as an incentive to vindicate minor injury when other mech-
anisms are available.
When the damages are more severe, the argument that the unavaila-
bility of punitive damages would deter plaintiffs from suing large corpo-
rate enterprises due to the complexity of the suit or the corporation's
overwhelming legal resources is without merit. For example, in the ex-
ploding Pinto case,486 it cannot be argued that the horribly mutilated and
burned plaintiff would not have brought her suit absent the potential for
a punitive damages verdict. Nor can it be argued that there is a lack of
products liability lawsuits against corporations in those states that pro-
hibit punitive damages.487 There also appears to be no lack of wrongful
death lawsuits against manufacturers despite the statutory preclusion of
punitive damages in such actions.48 8 That wrongful death suits often in-
volve products manufacturers489 or large corporate enterprises490 obvi-
ates any argument that legitimate claims are deterred by the prospect of
ited and parties may use affidavits in lieu of direct testimony. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 85-100 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984).
486. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
487. Although Washington State prohibits punitive damages, products liability suits
against auto and truck manufacturers are prevalent. See, e.g., Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93
Wash. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980); Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d
751, 522 P.2d 829 (1974); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969);
Tokarz v. Ford Motor Co., 8 Wash. App. 645, 508 P.2d 1370 (1973).
488. See, eg., In re Paris Air Crash, 427 F. Supp. 701 (C.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 622 F.2d
1315 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980) (constitutional challenge to statutory denial
of punitive damages in wrongful death actions); Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d
425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (cannot recover punitive damages in wrongful
death action where forbidden by statute); Georgie Boy Mfg., Inc. v. Superior Court, 115 Cal.
App. 3d 217, 171 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1981) (rational basis exists in statutory denial of punitive
damages in wrongful death cases).
489. Eg., Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982). In that case,
15 individual claims of asbestos poisoning had been consolidated for trial. Id. at 365. As of
1984, there were over 16,000 asbestos related suits pending against the Johns-Manville Corpo-
ration. United Press Int'l News Serv. (available on DIALOG, General News Section, Jan. 3,
1984, A.M. cycle). As another example, 10,000 suits were filed against A.H. Robins for inju-
ries arising from a defectively manufactured intrauterine contraceptive. UnsafeProducts: The
Great Debate Over Blame and Punishment, Bus. WK., Apr. 30, 1984, at 96, 100.
490. See, eg., In re Air Crash Disaster, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
878 (1981). This case exemplifies the eagerness of plaintiffs to assert claims for punitive dam-
ages. The complex opinion had to consider whether to allow punitive damages against the
manufacturer of a DC-10 or the airline involved in the crash, since "[tlhe law of the place of
disaster, the law of the place of manufacture of the airplane, and the law of the primary place
of business of the airplane [did] not allow punitive damages; but, the law of primary place of
business of the manufacturer of airplane and the law of the place of the maintenance of the
airplane [did] allow punitive damages." Id. at 604. There were 118 wrongful death actions at
issue, many requesting punitive damages. Id. Punitive damages were disallowed under the
law of Illinois. One commentator summed up the case by observing that, "[i]n applying the
law of Illinois, the court of appeals was able to avoid the inequity of allowing punitive damage
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fighting a large corporation.491
The other alternative justification for punitive damages is that they
provide costs and attorneys' fees in situations where the plaintiff prevails
on a cause of action for damages arising out of "outrageous conduct."4 92
As one commentator explained, "punitive damages tend to alleviate,
however imprecisely, the rigors of the American rule."493 The American
rule on attorneys' fees provides that absent statutory authorization, attor-
neys' fees are not available to prevailing litigants in civil actions.4 94 Such
fees may be awarded as an exception to the rule where "the losing party
has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, or for oppressive reasons.
'495
Although state courts have developed other exceptions,496 state legisla-
tures and Congress497 generally make provisions for attorneys' fees and
costs where bad faith litigation is involved4 98 or where interests benefit a
claims against one defendant and not against the other." Note, Conflict of Laws, 47 J. AIR L. &
COM. 339, 359 (1982).
491. In defense of allowing punitive damages in products liability actions, Professor Owen
contends that the complexities and expense of litigating a valid claim may deter a claimant
from seeking a remedy, and that manufacturers may "take advantage of [the] practical short-
comings in the legal system." Owen, supra note 453, at 1293-94. But see supra note 487 and
accompanying text.
492. See the collection of cases at 30 A.L.R. 3D 1448-53 (1970 & Supp. 1984).
493. Owen, supra note 453, at 1297. Another commentator has attempted to rationalize
punitive damages as attorneys' fees by concluding that such damages seem "consistent with the
historic rule of punitive damages as a means of compensating plaintiffs for otherwise non-
compensable elements of injury." Note, supra note 3, at 1163. The author cites to Michigan
and Connecticut for support, but those states utilize the doctrine for nonpunitive ends. See
supra notes 458-61 and accompanying text.
494. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975).
495. Id. at 258-59. In McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109 (1st Cir. 1971), cert denied,
408 U.S. 943 (1972), the court held that the plaintiff could recover fees where he was forced to
seek by way of litigation an administrative reason explaining why his employment contract
was not renewed, something he was constitutionally entitled to under procedural due process.
Id. at 1112.
496. See, eg., Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977)
(noting that courts recognize exceptions to the American rule when passive beneficiaries derive
a benefit from a prevailing litigant who financed the cause of action and thus created a fund
from which the beneficiaries profit; or, under the "substantial benefit theory," courts may re-
quire beneficiaries to help pay the costs of litigation).
497. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 271.
498. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. § 298(C) & (D) (1976) (reasonable attorney fees and costs in addi-
tion to punitive damages for defendant when action is brought "frivolously, for the purposes of
harassment, or in implementation of any scheme in restraint of trade"); 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d) &
(e) (1982) (reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and punitive damages in action for unlawful credi-
tor discrimination); 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Supp. 1984) (reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as well
as punitive damages for unlawful interception of wire or oral communications); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 1021-39 (West 1980 & Supp. 1984) (delineating instances where attorneys' fees
and costs are mandated).
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large class.499
There is often an attempt, however, to ignore these limited excep-
tions to the American rule by justifying punitive damages as fees and
costs. Professor Owen has stated that such awards mitigate the cost of
litigation to plaintiffs, who may pay up to one-third of a compensatory
damages verdict in legal fees."° Nevertheless, no logical exception to the
American rule legitimately transmutes punitive damages into awards for
attorneys' fees. By statutory authority, costs and attorneys' fees are
often awarded separately in the same actions where punitive damages are
assessed.501 Thus, legislatures specifically provide fees and costs as ele-
ments separate from punitive damages when they believe such costs are
justified and necessary.
Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court stated the control-
ling rule on attorneys' fees and costs in punitive damages actions. In Day
v. Woodworth,5"2 the Court held that punitive damages were not a func-
tion of fees and costs since they did not inure to the prevailing defend-
ant.5 03 Punitive damages awards are based on considerations of wanton,
malicious, oppressive, or outrageous conduct, not litigation expenses."
499. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980). This rule permits reimbursement
of attorneys' fees "in cases where the litigation has conferred a substantial benefit on the mem-
bers of an ascertainable class, and where the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit makes possible an award that will operate to spread the costs proportionately among
them." Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 393-94 (1970).
500. Owen, supra note 453, at 1297.
501. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (1983); ALASKA R. CT. P. 54, 79, & 82; Sturm,
Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 627 P.2d 204, 205 (Alaska 1981) (since attorneys' fees are not a
function of punitive damages, it is error to deny such fees arbitrarily even though punitive
damages are awarded).
In one products liability case, the Third Circuit remanded on the issue of attorneys' fees
(awarded under V. I. CODE ANN., tit. 5, § 541(b) (1967)) because such fees under state law
must reflect the quality of an attorney's work as evidenced by the amount of recovery. Since a
punitive damages judgment was reversed on appeal in the case, the court ordered a reevalua-
tion of the fees awarded. As noted in the case, fees were awarded separately and proportioned
to the judgment, including the punitive damages judgment. Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717
F.2d 828, 843-44 (3rd Cir. 1983). See also Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 217, 400 N.Y.S.2d
668, 678-79 (1977) (attorneys' fees as a cost of litigation considered separately from issue of
punitive damages award).
502. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
503. Id. at 373.
504. The general rule is reflected in the Idaho Supreme Court's holding that if punitive
damages are to be "viewed as compensatory damages, there is no sound reason apparent...
why they should be allowed in this class of actions rather than in any other kind of a tort
action." Baird v. Gibberd, 32 Idaho 796, 803, 189 P. 56, 58 (1920). And, as the Minnesota
Supreme Court astutely observed:
The expenses of the prosecution can afford no criterion by which to judge of the
degree of malice, oppression or outrage of which the defendant has been guilty, and
for which he is to be punished [by punitive damages]; nor can the quantum of punish-
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A number of courts, however, have calculated punitive damages by
using the "expenses of litigation" as a factor to consider in the assess-
ment.505 When considered rationally, however, compensation for attor-
neys' fees and costs as a purpose of punitive damages is not convincing.
Unlike statutes °6 and judicial rules507 permitting such costs, punitive
damages never occur as a matter of right, "no matter how egregious the
defendant's conduct."50 Additionally, punitive damages, unlike attor-
neys' fees and costs, are totally within the jury's discretion.509 Since the
jury does not consider litigation costs,510 it is difficult to justify fees and
costs as an alternative purpose to the punishment aspect of punitive dam-
ages. Nowhere else does the law permit a jury to determine an appropri-
ate amount of attorneys' fees. That issue is left to the wisdom and
experience of trial judges.5 11
In summary, no legitimate alternative purpose to the punishment
objective of punitive damages exists. Courts and statutes offer no pur-
pose outside retribution and deterrence. Punitive damages cannot be jus-
tified as paying for costs because in that case they would be no more
punitive than fee statutes. And given their uncontrolled assessment,
there is no rational connection to a compensatory purpose. Thus, no
legitimate remedial or regulatory purpose or effect attends the vindictive
award.
G. Excessiveness
The seventh Kennedy test is a subjective inquiry:512 whether the
ment which the defendant has deserved, and which will prevent the repetition of the
offense by him or others, be measured by these expenses. There is therefore no reason
why these expenses should be considered by the jury in arriving at that sum which, in
their judgment, will be sufficient as a punishment and an example.
Kelly v. Rogers, 21 Minn. 146, 153 (1874).
505. See Hall v. Memphis & Charleston Ry. Co., 15 F. 57, 94 (W.D. Tenn. 1882) and supra
note 456.
506. See supra note 498.
507. See supra notes 495-96.
508. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 52 (1983); see also Nissen v. Hobbs, 417 P.2d 250, 251
n.6 (Alaska 1966) (punitive damages represent a windfall to the plaintiff, not a right).
509. Generally, however, punitive damages should bear a reasonable relation to the injury
suffered. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 264 (1965).
510. But see supra notes 456 and 505 and accompanying text (some courts do allow litiga-
tion expenses as a function of punitive damage).
511. For example, in Clayton Act antitrust actions, the jury has no function in determining
reasonable attorneys' fees-it is left to a well-developed set of guidelines and the judge's discre-
tion. Pollack & Riley, Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 362 F. Supp. 335, 336 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
Reasonable attorneys' fees are evaluated in light of the court's experience. See Hew Corp. v.
Tandy Corp., 480 F. Supp. 758, 761 (D. Mass. 1979).
512. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 518 F.2d 990, 1010 (5th Cir. 1975), affid, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
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sanction "appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose as-
signed." '513 Although this test is not particularly useful since there is no
legitimate alternative purpose to punitive damages, a brief analysis
reveals that the method of punishment is determinative.
Again, the Kennedy Court cites Cummings v. Missouri,5 14 for the
proposition that where a state qualification for teaching and preaching
has no possible relation to the applicant's fitness for the calling, the re-
quirement is in excess of any legitimate regulatory purpose and can only
be labeled as punitive. 15 Helwig v. United States,"1 6 also cited, holds that
additional import duties on goods undervalued by the importer are not
themselves a penal sanction. 7 When the amount of the fine is "enor-
mously in excess" of the highest duty imposed on similar goods, how-
ever, the additional duty becomes penal.518 In Helwig, the additional
import duty of over one-half the value of the import goods transformed
the duty into a criminal sanction. Similarly, Kennedy relied upon United
States v. Constantine,5" 9 which held that a "tax" became penal when it
was "grossly disproportionate to the amount of the normal tax."520
When combined with a requirement that criminal conduct must trigger
the tax, the tax was found to have a penal purpose-making it penal in
design. 21
The Court also referred to Rex Trailer Co. v. United States. 22 The
defendant in Rex Trailer was convicted and fined for fraudulent
purchases of war surplus equipment from the federal government.
Thereafter, the government brought a civil suit to collect statutory civil
penalties totaling $10,000 for five individual violations. The Court held
the penalty remedial, since its effect and purpose indemnified the govern-
ment for injury. The injury included preventing "bona fide sales to veter-
ans," decreasing "the number of motor vehicles available to Government
agencies," and promoting "undesirable speculation. '5 23 Alhough the de-
fendant argued that no precise damage was alleged, the Court held that
the statutory recovery was comparable to the liquidated damages pro-
vided for in numerous government contracts. In light of the injury re-
513. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169.
514. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
515. Id. at 319.
516. 188 U.S. 605 (1903).
517. Id. at 613.
518. Id.
519. 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
520. Id. at 295.
521. Id.
522. 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
523. Id. at 153.
Winter 1985] PENAL DIMENSIONS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
sulting from the fraud, the fine was not excessive and its predetermined
level did not transform an intended civil penalty into a criminal one.524
The Kennedy Court then distinguished the Child Labor Tax Case
525
from the other cases cited.526 In that case the Court held the collateral
effect of punishment does not render a tax unconstitutional per se,527
even though the tax must still relate to a legitimate taxing purpose.528
Also cited was Flemming v. Nestor,.29 which directly supports the sev-
enth Kennedy factor. The opinion's essence is that Congress may exer-
cise its legitimate regulatory powers regardless of the punitive effect as
long as they are not utilized to single out speefic persons. 5 30 The Court
was careful to point out that the severity of a sanction is not "determina-
tive of its character as 'punishment.' "531 Thus, Flemming merely reaf-
firms that a legitimate exercise of governmental power is not
unconstitutional because of its incidental retributive effect, as long as it
reasonably relates to an alternative legislative goal.
The term "excessive" cannot be used in the abstract. As the opin-
ions demonstrate, the determination combines the amount of the penalty,
the type of wrong, and whether or not the statute's punitive effect is
aimed at an individual rather than regulation of a legitimate government
interest. Thus, the overall method of assessment must not be "excessive."
The major factor that indicates a reasonable method of penalty as-
sessment is the degree of flexibility provided in the assessment. 532 To
determine whether the penalty assessment possesses the requisite degree
of flexibility, courts rely upon five determinative factors. First, is the
degree of harm proportionate to the judgment imposed?533 Second, is the
gravity of the offense considered for mitigation purposes? 534 Third, is the
size of the defendant's business or his financial condition a mitigating
524. Id. at 154.
525. 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
526. Both the Child Labor Tax Case and Flemming v. Nestor were cited as authority analo-
gous to the other cases cited in support of the seventh Kennedy test. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169
n.28.
527. 259 U.S. at 41-43.
528. Id.
529. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
530. Id. at 616. The legislation, which denied deportees Social Security benefits, was found
to bear a reasonable relation to the challenged statute. Id. at 617.
531. Id. at 616 n.9.
532. Providing "flexibility" in assessing the penalty to the circumstances of actual injury or
damage indicates a remedial rather than a penal effect or purpose. United States v. General
Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp. at 1163.
533. Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352, 1357 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
534. Atlas Roofing Co., 518 F.2d at 1011.
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factor?.35 Fourth, is the wrongdoer's good faith taken into account?
5 3 6
Finally, are previous violations--or a lack thereof- an enhancing or
mitigating factor?
5 37
With respect to the first factor, assessment mechanisms for punitive
damages clearly fail. As discussed above, punitive damages are deter-
mined according to the outrageousness of the tortfeasor's behavior. It is
not the extent of the injury that is determinative, but rather the conduct
leading to it. Nevertheless, a number of jurisdictions have adopted the
"ratio rule" for assessing punitive damages. 5 38 This rule takes into ac-
count the degree of reprehensibility, but adjusts the penalty to the
amount of actual damages awarded. 539 Generally, where the compensa-
tory damages are small, even "considerable reprehensibility will not be
seen to justify a proportionally high amount of punitive damages
S. ... 54 Although this rule ostensibly points to a "reasonable method"
of assessment where an alternative purpose to punishment supports puni-
tive damages, in practice it does not. While appellate courts will remit a
jury's verdict to comply with the "ratio rule," '541 it is not done with any
regular consistency, and verdicts nearly two hundred times the actual




538. D. DOBBS, supra note 188, at 211. See also 22 AM JUR. 2D Damages § 264 (1965).
539. Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 751, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 243
(1980). The Second Restatement of Torts takes the position that wealth of the defendant is
relevant since punishment and deterrence are related "to the means of the guilty person."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment e (1979).
540. Rosener, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 751, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
541. See Cunningham v. Simpson, 1 Cal. 3d 301, 308-09, 461 P.2d 39, 46, 81 Cal. Rptr.
855, 859 (1969) and supra note 123.
542. Finney v. Lockhart, 35 Cal. 2d 161, 217 P.2d 19 (1950). In Wetherbee v. United Ins.
Co. of Am., 18 Cal. App. 3d 266, 95 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1971), the court refused to remit a
$200,000 punitive damages judgment assessed in addition to $1,050 actual damages. The de-
fendant had been found liable for fraudulent misrepresentations made in connection with an
insurance contract. The court reasoned that:
"[jury] estimates of what would be sufficient as a punishment and a deterrent and an
example was very high as compared with the actual damages assessed and high from
any point of view, but it would hardly be candid to invite them in the language of this
instruction to fix such sum which expressed their judgment in such matter, and then
charge them with bias or perversity because the measure of their abhorrence of de-
fendant's conduct and their judgment of what would be a sufficient punishment and
deterrent was represented by a larger sum of money than that which some other man
or men would have allowed."
Wetherbee, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 272, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 682 (quoting Scott v. Times-Mirror Co.,
181 Cal. 345, 367, 184 P. 672, 682 (1919)).
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awards, a trial judge does not control punitive damage assessments.
5 43
Moreover, punitive damages are not compared to injury under the
ratio rule to determine whether an alternative purpose is supported.
544
Rather, they are compared with compensatory damages solely to deter-
mine whether the given punishment is justified.5 45 But even the defer-
ence given to the ratio rule is often inadequate. The ability of a jury to
disregard it and the reluctance of the judiciary to disturb the verdict
point to a method of assessment that is excessive both in mode and
manner.
The second factor is whether mitigation is available by considering
the gravity of the offense. Under the punitive damages doctrine, even
where the "ratio rule" is available, the gravity of the offense may control
the assessment of damages. But unlike those civil penalty statutes saved
from a penal label by their quasi-remedial nature, neither the judge nor
the jury is guided by a statutory maximum or minimum fine in punitive
damages assessment. Thus, the trier of fact legislatively determines al-
lowable punishment and then assesses the penalty based on the circum-
stances before it. No federal civil statute grants the trier-of-fact authority
to delineate the boundaries of allowable penalties.546
The third factor considers the financial worth of a defendant or his
business and the ability to survive a penalty assessment. This inquiry is
similar to the considerations of wealth utilized by a number of jurisdic-
tions in determining the appropriate level of punitive damages.547 Essen-
tially, the award must be great enough to cause financial discomfort,
54
but not so large that it would cause bankruptcy.549 Although this rule
takes into account the defendant's net worth as a function of deter-
rence,550 it is not the universal rule.551 The prevailing punishment and
deterrence aspect of punitive damages simply cannot be escaped. As one
543. While the trial judge may remit a punitive damages award, the initial assessment is
totally within the jury's unfettered discretion.
544. See supra note 222.
545. There are ceiling levels on fine amounts in all federal civil penalty statutes. A collec-
tion of over 100 such statutes is listed in Atlas Roofing Co., 518 F.2d at 1001-09.
546. The amount of a fixed fine under civil penalty statutes may become penal if the full
amount of the fine is excessive in relation to any conceived remedial purpose. See In re Garay,
89 N.J. 104, 444 A.2d 1107 (1982).
547. D. DOBBS, supra note 188, at 211.
548. "The purpose of punitive damages is to sting, not kill, a defendant. Punitive damages
should not be permitted to bankrupt a defendant." In re "Dalkon Shield," 526 F. Supp. at
899. See also Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 751, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237,
243 (1980) (function of deterrence not served if defendant can "absorb" the punishment with-
out discomfort).
549. Wynn Oil Co. v. Purolator Chem. Corp., 403 F. Supp. 226, 232 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
550. Rosener, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 751, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
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New York court pointed out, punishment as an objective has nothing to
do with the wealth of the defendant.
552
Nevertheless, in those jurisdictions that consider the defendant's fi-
nancial condition, it can be argued that the rule lends support to a
nonexcessive method of penalty assessment. Trial judges and appellate
courts are more likely to remit or reverse an award on the basis of pas-
sion and prejudice where the wealth factor is applied. 53 Reduction of
punitive damages awards, however, is purely arbitrary. Since a jury need
not reveal its method of determination, it is not always certain that the
award was disproportionate as a result of prejudice on the issue of
wealth. As Professor Owen pointed out, the latent biases of jurors
against business, for instance, may condemn the wealthier defendant
before he even enters the courtroom. 554 Thus, the jury initially may as-
sign liability on considerations wholly removed from culpability.5 By
allowing the jury to hear evidence of wealth during the culpability phase
of the trial, the initial decision to punish may not have been properly
deliberated. Therefore, any subsequent penalty assessed by the jury
would constitute an excessive assessment method since there is no way to
determine if the jury found liability on grounds independent of wealth.
Even given judicial remittitur, the reasonable method of assessment
seems speculative at best.
The fourth factor considers the defendant's good faith, if any. Good
faith is not only a mitigating factor in punitive damages, but also may
offer a complete defense.556 Generally, an action against a good faith
defendant will not support a punitive damages claim since by defini-
551. See Finney v. Lockhart, 35 Cal. 2d 161, 164, 217 P.2d 19, 21 (1950) (the "reasonable
relation rule" is applied only to prevent excessive awards). Additionally, a number of courts
utilizing the "reasonable relation rule" simultaneously require more severe punishment for
more reprehensible acts, a contradiction in logic since a defendant may be liable for a relatively
minor instance of bad conduct, but may be fairly wealthy. Thus, the award must be small in
relation to the conduct, but large in proportion to his wealth. See Thomas v. E.J. Korvette,
Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1163, 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd, 476 F.2d 471 (1973); D. DOBBS, supra
note 188, at 211.
552. The "reasonable relationship rule" is rejected by New York courts since it is the con-
duct that must be punished sufficiently regardless of the defendant's wealth. See Star Credit
Corp. v. Ingram, 75 Misc. 2d 299, 347 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1973).
553. See, eg., Yeager v. Hurt, 433 So. 2d 1176 (Ala. 1983); Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 133 Ariz.
348, 651 P.2d 876 (1982); Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 928, 582 P.2d 980, 990,
148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 399 (1978).
554. Owen, supra note 376, at 351 n.56.
555. The case may have already been decided for the jury in the press.
556. See Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 285 N.E.2d 849, 334
N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973). For instance, where an insurer has
breached its duty to settle a claim, it will be liable only up to the policy limits and possible
defense costs as long as it did not act in bad faith. Id.
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tion 57 it rebuts those states of mind needed to support culpability.
55 8
This factor points towards a reasonable method of penalty assessment.
The final factor considers previous violations. This element tips the
scales towards unreasonableness when applied to punitive damages. Pre-
vious violations are not a function of jury deliberations on any claim for
punitive damages.559 While a jury may subconsciously consider a de-
fendant's past behavior, it is free to fix the standards of assessment in
each case. 56 For example, first time offenders often are penalized so se-
verely as to negate any realistic belief that prior behavior is a function of
jury deliberation. A number of manufacturers have been subjected to
potentially bankrupting awards despite no evidence of collateral
wrongs.56' Any relationship of "alternative purpose to an award of puni-
tive damages" is fortuitous, and the reasonable inference is that the pen-
alty is really punishment deserving of criminal procedural protections. 62
In conclusion, many of the factors outlined by federal courts evi-
dencing a reasonable method of penalty assessment generally are con-
tained in the civil penalty statutes themselves. Punitive damages statutes
have no similar provisions. The good faith exceptions have been judi-
557. Hash v. Hogan, 453 P.2d 469, 475 & n.19 (Alaska 1969).
558. See Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 285 N.E.2d 849, 334
N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973).
559. Neither the fact of conviction nor the chance of conviction will bar an assessment of
punitive damages. Additionally, mitigation is not available where the defendant has received
criminal punishment for the same wrong. See the cases collected at 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages,
§ 248 (1965).
560. For instance, in California, the approved jury instruction for oppression sufficient to
support punitive damages liability provides merely that "[o]pression means subjecting a person
to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights." CAL. JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 14.71 (6th ed. Supp. 1983). The unbordered definition of "oppression"
enables plaintiffs to cultivate juror sympathy and prejudice.
561. By 1983, the A.H. Robins Company had $2.3 billion in punitive damages claims pend-
ing against it in the Dalkon Shield suits. President Robins stated: "If every case judgment was
against us, there would be no A.H. Robins." A.H. Robins: Boosting R&D to Inject New Life
into Drug Sales, Bus. WK., Feb. 21, 1983, at 119-20. Union Carbide Corporation now faces
the possibility of being "driven into bankruptcy court." By 1985, more than $20 billion in
compensatory and punitive damages claims were being sought with the claims for punitive
damages premised on Union Carbide's disregard for the safety of Bhopal residents. Union
Carbide Fights for Its Life, Bus. WK., Dec. 24, 1984, at 52.
Despite the social and economic impact of mass punitive damages awards, bankruptcy
may not be a concern to some courts. One Pennsylvania court rejected any bankruptcy disas-
ter argument, stating that if the offending conduct deserves punishment and bankruptcy is the
result, the court is "hard pressed to understand why that defendant should not be required to
live with its consequences." Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 469 A.2d 655, 665 (Pa. Super.
1983).
562. If the alternative justification offered is arbitrary or purposeless, the inference may be
drawn that the sanction is criminal punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979).
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cially created. 63 The penal dimension of punitive damages therefore is
strengthened by the absence of any statutorily prescribed limits on pen-
alty assessments, the availability of which has saved civil penalty statutes
from criminal labels.
Finally, as the Supreme Court has stated, "[r]etribution and deter-
rence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives." 5" Where
punishment is the primary rather than the incidental effect of a sanction,
no assertion of an alternative purpose or corresponding relationship will
save it from due process challenges. 65
A perfect example is mass tort or mass disaster litigation, where a
defendant may have injured many persons through a single tort or a pro-
longed course of tortious conduct. The general rule is that all mass tort
victims of a single or continuous tort may sue for and recover punitive
damages because allowing only one punitive damages recovery would be
"unequal treatment" for subsequent litigants.5 66 This general trend was
reflected in State ex rel. Young v. Crookham. 67 In that case, a number of
plaintiffs were injured when raw sewage overflowed into a large water
supply. Following an initial lawsuit in which the first plaintiff collected
punitive damages, the defendant moved for summary judgment to pre-
vent any further punitive damages awards. The trial court granted the
defendant's motion, but the state supreme court held that total elimina-
tion of all punitive damages after the first plaintiff had been paid was an
inappropriate cure for mass litigation. The court held there were other
alternatives to the problem of multiple punitive damages judgments.568
Therefore, it could not allow a system that reduced civil justice to a race
563. Ebaugh v. Rabkin, 22 Cal. App. 2d 891, 895, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706, 709 (1972) (reason-
able mistake of fact a defense to punitive damages liability); Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 439, 285 N.E.2d 849, 855, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 610 (1972) (no punitive
damages where breach of insurance contract not made in bad faith).
564. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979).
565. Id.
566. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 939 (2d Cir. 1967) (no prin-
ciple exists prohibiting multiple punitive damages recovery). See also Neal v. Carey Can.
Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 376-77 (E.D. Pa. 1982); State ex reL Young v. Crookham, 290
Or. 61, 64-70, 618 P.2d 1268, 1270-74 (1980); 11 A.L.R. 4TH 1261-67 (1982) (reviewing the
"first corner" doctrine of punitive damages). But see In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 97 F.R.D.
380, 381-82 n.1 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (some jurisdictions may limit multiple punitive damages
awards, though it is "unfair" to the victims).
567. 290 Or. 61, 618 P.2d 1268 (1980).
568. The court noted that alternatives included jury consideration of the effect of multiple
punitive damages awards and class actions "for unitary consideration of such damages." Ad-
ditionally, the court stated that "other creative and applicable approaches, as yet unsurmised
by legal commentators, may be devised by attorneys and judges of this state" to address the
problem of multiple punishment. Young, 290 Or. at 72, 618 P.2d at 1274.
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to the courthouse.5 69 The court spoke of justice to the plaintiff rather
than to the defendant, who was the one being punished and whose rights
were at issue.
570
An argument may be made that no logical fair play justification can
be offered since a criminal may also receive multiple punishment. Both
the state and federal governments may prosecute him for the same
wrong. 571 But this argument does not address the typical multiple dam-
ages claim. Unlike criminal penalties, punitive damages may be awarded
for conduct that occurred outside the jurisdiction by virtue of state "long
arm statutes. '572 The state may even punish a foreign citizen for a
wrong that may not have been punishable in the state where the wrong
was committed. 7 3 Moreover, a plaintiff is entitled to "full faith and
credit" in a sister jurisdiction to enforce a punitive damages award.574
Additionally, nothing bars a punitive damages claim against a defendant
who has been previously convicted for the same wrong.
5 75
Once again, the punitive damages method of penalty assessment
proves excessive. Even if a legitimate alternative purpose is shown, as-
sessment not only fails to account for defendant's previous violations, but
also allows repeated penalty assessments for improper courses of conduct
where a "mass tort" is involved. As illustrated by the multitude of suits
arising out of asbestos poisoning, 76 penalizing a single wrong knows no
jurisdictional limitation. And every forum that can assert jurisdiction
may assess a penalty.577 But courts will not tolerate an exaggerated re-
sponse to a legitimate purpose.5 78 The unchecked avenues available for
-penalizing a punitive damages defendant, with no attendant relationship
to anything but retribution and deterrence, destroys any argument of "le-
gitimate alternative purpose."
569. Id. at 67, 618 P.2d at 1272.
570. Id. at 65-70, 618 P.2d at 1271-72.
571. Only when entities of the same sovereign are involved will a conviction or acquittal by
one entity bar prosecution for the same wrong in another. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387
(1970). Nevertheless, the punitive damages defendant may be punished for the same tort in
multiple jurisdictions, whether or not the tort was committed within the state. Jurisdiction
may be obtained by "long arm statutes." See supra note 386.
572. See supra note 571.
573. See supra note 386, 387.
574. Id.
575. See upra note 559.
576. See, eg., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 566 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Henson v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 564 F. Supp. 497 (D. Md. 1983); Moran v. Johns-Manville Corp., 28
Bankr. 376 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Rocco v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 80-0608 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10,
1982).
577. See supra note 386.
578. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539 n.20.
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Conclusion
Punitive damages are an anomaly in civil law. Examining them
through the seven-factor Kennedy framework proves that they are an ex-
tension of the penal system designed to exact retribution as a deterrent to
socially undesirable behavior. The result emasculates the symmetry be-
tween civil and criminal law and procedure." 9 To continue to allow pu-
nitive damages as we know them requires an explicit acknowledgment
that pure retribution, previously justified only as a penal goal, may be
exacted through the civil system. Punitive damages are and continue to
be a gross deviation from the historic rule that the criminal justice system
cannot delegate its power of retribution. However, the Supreme Court
has never addressed this aspect of punitive damages. Should the Court
ever consider the issue, the advice of Justice Roberts provides significant
guidance: "illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first foot-
ing. . .by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of
procedures."' 0 As he pointed out, it must be the duty of the courts to
watch for such encroachments and to remedy the wrongs when they are
discovered.58 1
Perhaps the best solution to the constitutional questions surround-
ing the punitive damages doctrine is to accept the New Hampshire
Supreme Court's resolution of the problem in 1872: "The true rule, sim-
ple and just, is to keep the civil and the criminal process and practice
distinct and separate. '582 As the court then observed, it is only on "the
supposed weight of authority" that the doctrine survives; it has not been
made "to stand upon principle and inherent strength.,
5 3
579. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873).
580. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1885).
581. Id.
582. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. at 397.
583. Id. at 353.
